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DOCTRINAL FEEDBACK AND (UN)REASONABLE CARE
James Gibson*
THE law frequently derives its content from the practices of the
community it regulates. Examples are legion: Tort's reasonable
care standard demands that we all exercise the prudence of an "ordi-
nary" person. Ambiguous contracts find meaning in custom and usage
of trade. The Fourth Amendment examines our collective expectations
of privacy. And so on. This recourse to real-world circumstance has in-
tuitive appeal, in that it helps courts resolve fact-dependent disputes and
lends legitimacy to their judgments.
Yet real-world practice can depart from that which the law expects.
For example, suppose a physician provides more than reasonable
care-extra tests, unneeded procedures, etc.-so as to steer clear of tort
liability's considerable gray area. If other physicians follow suit, their
precautions slowly but surely become the new legal norm, as the rea-
sonable care standard dutifully absorbs the conduct of those it governs.
Instead of discouraging wasteful practices, then, the law feeds them
back into doctrine, transforming overcompliance into mere compliance
and ratcheting up the standard of care. Overcautious physicians conse-
quently have to do even more to steer clear of liability, and the cycle be-
gins anew.
This Article provides a general model of this "doctrinal feedback"
phenomenon and then applies it to medical malpractice, where tort's
reasonable care standard has caused an unhealthy and unappreciated
feedback effect and has led the law to require an unreasonable level of
care. In doing so, it reveals feedback's surprisingly common formative
factors and demonstrates its potential to skew legal norms in a variety
of otherwise dissimilar fields.
Associate Professor of Law, University of Richmond. This Article benefited
greatly from the input of Ken Abraham, Tom Baker, Albert Choi, John Douglass,
Tonja Jacobi, Jody Kraus, Corinna Lain, Paul Mahoney, Tom Massaro, Shari Motro,
Jeff O'Connell, David Opderbeck, Glen Robinson, David Studdert, Walter Wadling-
ton, Rebecca West, and Ted White; from presentations at the University of Richmond
School of Law's Virginia Junior Faculty Forum and the 2007 SEALS conference; and
from law faculty workshops at Seton Hall, the University of Virginia, and Washington
and Lee. Thanks also to Ben Doherty, Bryan Kasik, and Michelle Morris of the Uni-
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INTRODUCTION
Every first-year torts student learns about reasonable care, that
venerable legal standard that requires us to act "reasonably" lest
we be judged negligent. Indeed, reasonable care has been tort law's
touchstone for over one hundred years.1 It has evolved over time
from arbiter of community morals to dispassionate agent of eco-
nomic efficiency,2 but all along it has invoked the conduct of a per-
son "of ordinary prudence" and exhorted tortfeasors "to do what
such an ideal individual would be supposed to do in his place., 3
'See Michael D. Green, Negligence = Economic Efficiency: Doubts >, 75 Tex. L.
Rev. 1605, 1617-18 (1997) (noting that torts treatises from 1895-1910 "almost exclu-
sively define negligence in terms of ordinary or reasonable care under the circum-
stances").
2 See G. Edward White, Tort Law in America: An Intellectual History 324-27 (ex-
panded ed. 2003).
3 Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 32, at 174 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed.
1984).
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For the torts student looking for the "right" answer on an exam,
reasonable care can be a frustratingly imprecise concept. Yet that
imprecision turns out to be an advantage. Reasonable care is the
prototypical standard in the standard-versus-rule sense: its ambigu-
ity gives courts the flexibility they need to arrive at the correct
judgment in a fact-dependent context.4 And reasonable care's ref-
erence to ordinary prudence and real-world practice adds to its ap-
peal, lending legitimacy to its determinations. It grounds policy in
the friendly and comfortable territory of shared experience, of
conventional wisdom, of consensus. Who can object to a law that
merely asks its subjects to act reasonably? What could be more
reasonable than a reasonable care standard?
Within this familiar concept, however, lurks a phenomenon-
unappreciated in the literature and unrecognized in the courts-
that threatens to lead tort law astray. Suppose a potential tortfea-
sor wants to steer clear of conduct that would fall short of the rea-
sonable care metric. Because it is difficult to know ex ante what
conduct will qualify, he or she may overcomply (i.e., exercise more
caution than the standard actually demands). If others behave the
same way, however, that degree of caution will become the new
measure of negligence; if everyone is exhibiting the same overcau-
tious level of care, the "ordinary person" has become overcautious
as well. What was once overcompliance therefore becomes mere
compliance. Our potential tortfeasor must then be even more
overcautious than before in order to avoid the inevitable gray area
that accompanies reasonable care. Thus the process repeats itself: a
new level of caution is introduced, it eventually becomes the legal
standard, this new standard then prompts yet another iteration of
overcompliance, and so forth.'
I call this phenomenon "doctrinal feedback," and in a previous
Article I discussed its subtle and pernicious effect on intellectual
property law.6 Here I will show that the feedback phenomenon has
'See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 129 (1961) (citing reasonable care as the
best example of when the inadequacy of ex ante rulemaking warrants giving courts
discretion over a case's proper outcome).
'Systematic undercompliance would produce a similar cycle, but in the opposite di-
rection-a ratcheting down of the level of care. As we will see, however, the example
discussed in this Article involves consistent overcompliance.
6James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law,
116 Yale L.J. 882, 885 (2007).
1643
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the potential to skew legal norms not only in intellectual property
but also in negligence law, and indeed in a broad array of otherwise
dissimilar fields. Part I will set forth a general model of doctrinal
feedback, identify its two surprisingly common formative factors,
and show that it calls into question the wisdom of using real-world
practice to define legal standards. Part II will illustrate how the
model works by applying it to tort's reasonable care standard, and
specifically to medical malpractice law, where legal ambiguity, def-
erence to custom, and the specter of liability have produced a per-
fect storm of dysfunctionality and wasteful practice. Part III will
discuss feedback's implications for tort reform and demonstrate
the difficulty of addressing the feedback problem in isolation. Fi-
nally, Part IV will explore the potential for a feedback effect in
other fields of law.
In the end, doctrinal feedback requires us to rethink-and in
some cases abandon-many of our assumptions about the wisdom
of legal norms that rely on real-world practice. If a standard as
time-tested as "reasonable care" can create and perpetuate waste-
ful medical practices rather than leading us to a better place, the
implications for the many other fields in which a feedback poten-
tial lurks are severe, and severely distressing.
I. THE DOCTRINAL FEEDBACK MODEL
Suppose a physician is examining a swollen lymph node for indi-
cations of cancer. After a physical examination and x-rays, she is
nearly certain that the node is merely infected and that the patient
should simply take some antibiotics and come back in a few weeks
to make sure the swelling has receded.
But the physician is concerned about negligence liability. She
knows that there is a chance, however small, that the swelling is
cancerous-and if it is, a jury might find her liable for a faulty di-
agnosis even though she strongly (and rightfully) believes that she
is exercising reasonable care. She therefore overcomplies: she or-
ders an ultrasound as well, despite her conviction that the proce-
dure is unnecessary and wasteful.
As an isolated incident, this overcompliance would not be par-
ticularly troubling. But if a sufficient number of her fellow physi-
cians order an ultrasound in similar circumstances, it will become
common practice. And once it does, its use will eventually cease to
1644 [Vol. 94:1641
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constitute more than reasonable care, because reasonable care
draws its definition from the typical conduct of those it regulates.
In other words, the ultrasound's ubiquity will make it part of the
reasonable care standard; the overcautious practice feeds back into
doctrine, making negligence law more demanding and requiring
physicians to use a medically unnecessary and wasteful technique.
This "doctrinal feedback" cycle might then repeat itself. Now
that the ultrasound represents mere compliance, rather than over-
compliance, it no longer constitutes more care than the law de-
mands. So the next time our overcautious physician encounters a
swollen lymph node and wants to give liability a wide berth, she
may order not only an ultrasound, but a biopsy as well. And if her
fellow physicians do the same, reasonable care ratchets upward
once again, incorporating the use of a biopsy into the negligence
standard.
Or so the theory goes. If doctrinal feedback were the sum total
of negligence law, however, we would all be wearing bubble wrap
and driving two miles per hour. Describing the potential for a
feedback loop is one thing; determining how much explanatory
power it actually has in tort liability and elsewhere is another. The
challenge, then, is to identify those elements that contribute to doc-
trinal feedback and integrate them into a generalizable model that
will help us determine whether and when doctrinal feedback occurs
and how much of a role it plays in the law's evolution.
Meeting this challenge requires a more discerning evaluation of
feedback's two formative factors, each of which can be seen at
work in our ultrasound example. First, feedback occurs only when
legal doctrine refers to real-world practice, as when tort's reason-
able care standard incorporates the conduct of the "ordinary per-
son." Second, feedback occurs only when the real-world practice at
issue departs from that which doctrine demands, as when our phy-
sician provides more care than the law requires. The following dis-
cussion addresses each factor and explains when we might see
them combine to produce a feedback effect.
1645
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A. Reference to Real-World Practice
When designing a legal norm, the law frequently looks to the
typical practices of those it seeks to regulate. Ambiguous contract
terms find meaning in "custom" and "usage of trade.",7 Whether
one trademark infringes on another depends on whether "ordi-
nary" consumers using "ordinary" care are likely to confuse the
two." And then there is that familiar legal fiction, "reasonableness,"
which invites us to use real-world practice as a guide for legal deci-
sionmaking: Tort law declares us negligent if we fail to provide
"reasonable care" and conform to the conduct of a "reasonable
person."9 The Fourth Amendment protects us from "unreasonable
searches and seizures,"1 a standard that has birthed such offspring
as "reasonable expectations of privacy"11 and "reasonable suspi-
cion."12 Jurors must be "reasonable" both in the doubts on which
they rely in acquitting a criminal defendant13 and in the verdicts
they render in civil court. 4 Employers must make "reasonable ac-
commodations" for their disabled employees. 5 And so forth; ex-
amples are legion.
The feedback potential that lurks within such norms is apparent:
if some unforeseen behavior skews the relevant real-world prac-
tice, the law itself will evolve in an unforeseen and possibly unde-
sirable direction. Yet the fact that a legal norm refers to real-world
practice does not necessarily mean that it blindly follows such prac-
tice. For example, in Fourth Amendment cases, courts do not usu-
ally canvass the citizenry for a consensus on the perceived reason-
ableness of the search or seizure at issue; instead, the inquiry tends
to be more abstract, as when courts use concepts like "plain view"
7 12 Samuel Williston & Richard A. Lord, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts
§ 34:5, at 29 (4th ed. 1999); U.C.C. § 2-202(a) (1977).
8 See, e.g., McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245,251 (1877).
'See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283 (1965).
'
0U.S. Const. amend. IV.
"Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
2 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (allowing warrantless search where police had
"reasonable grounds to believe that [the suspect] was armed and dangerous"); see
also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 268 (1973) (using term "reason-
able suspicion" to describe Terry's holding).
'3 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
'
4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 50.
,542 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (2000).
1646 [Vol. 94:1641
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and "open fields" as proxies for the public's expectations of pri-
vacy.16 The resulting doctrine therefore depends little on the every-
day conduct of those whom the standard governs, and that conduct
will have a correspondingly smaller impact on the development of
the law.
For this first feedback factor, then, the important variable is the
extent to which doctrine incorporates real-world practice. At one
extreme are legal norms that do not consider such matters at all.
Doctrinal feedback will have no explanatory power here. If the
speed limit on a particular road is fifty-five miles per hour, it will
remain fifty-five-at least as a formal matter-even if everyone
drives seventy."
At the other extreme are legal norms that defer extensively to
the conduct of those they govern. Picture a speed limit that con-
tinually varies based on the average speed of those cars that have
passed by over the preceding twenty-four hours. Here the influ-
ence of real-world practice on the applicable legal standard is
great, as is the feedback potential: if people consistently drive
slightly faster than the posted limit, that behavior will feed back
into the limit itself and cause it to steadily increase.
In between are legal norms that refer, but do not defer, to real-
world practice. Suppose all we require of drivers is that they drive
at "safe" speeds. The law might define "safe" based partly on what
people typically do (the outlier who drives twenty miles per hour
faster than everyone else will be hard-pressed to show that such
conduct is safe) and partly on studies of the relationship between
6 See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 141-42 (1990) (plain view); Oliver v.
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984) (open fields).
," This is not to say that bright-line rules are immune to the influence of real-world
practice or community consensus. For instance, if the public is sick of speed limits that
are too low, the legislature may well change them. Indeed, even rulings by judges with
life tenure do not stray too far from popular sentiment, see Corinna Barrett Lain,
Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren Court's Role in the
Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1361, 1361-69 (2004) (showing
that supposedly countermajoritarian criminal procedure decisions actually tended to
accord with public's prevailing views), and many constitutional doctrines show sur-
prising signs of majoritarian nose-counting, see Corinna Barrett Lain, Death Is Dif-
ferent, But Not Really (Mar. 3, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
Even so, the relationship between such consensus and subsequent changes in the law
will necessarily be more attenuated than the organic, inadvertent feedback effect that
is our focus here.
1647
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increased speeds and increased accidents. The speed of the "ordi-
nary driver" will accordingly exert some influence on the legal
standard, and thus create some potential for doctrinal feedback,
but the feedback effect will be limited by the rival influence of the
criterion that does not so directly incorporate real-world practice."
In short, then, a legal norm that gives high deference to the real-
world practice of those it governs increases the potential for doc-
trinal feedback, and low deference decreases it.
B. Departure from Expected Practice
Even when the law defers extensively to real-world practice,
however, doctrinal feedback will not always rear its ugly head.
There is another necessary ingredient: the practice that informs the
law must depart from the level of compliance that the law requires.
Consider again the self-adjusting speed limit. The feedback poten-
tial here is obvious-but it will be realized only if drivers consis-
tently drive faster or slower than the posted speed.
As it happens, there is a reason to expect such departures from
compliance, and it begins with the fact that many legal norms are
ambiguous. Suppose that enforcement of the speed limit is uncer-
tain; perhaps the police radar occasionally and unpredictably mal-
functions, so that it records a car's speed as slower or faster than it
actually is. Under such conditions, a driver who has much to gain
from speeding (e.g., he must get his laboring wife to the hospital)
might take his chances; he knows that he may escape punishment
even if he exceeds the limit, because the radar gun may err in his
favor and fail to detect his transgression. Under a different set of
assumptions, the opposite might happen: if driving more slowly
costs the driver little (no laboring wife), and the cost of a speeding
ticket is great (perhaps he is one violation away from losing his li-
cense), he will overcomply. In other words, he will drive more
slowly than required, because he knows that errors in enforcement
could lead to a costly citation even if he has not transgressed.
8 In practice, most speed-limit laws are about more than a numerical limit; one can
usually be ticketed for unsafe driving under prevailing conditions, even if one did not
exceed the posted limit. See, e.g., Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-861 (2001) ("A person shall
be guilty of reckless driving who exceeds a reasonable speed under the circumstances
and traffic conditions existing at the time, regardless of any posted speed limit.").
1648 [Vol. 94:1641
HeinOnline  -- 94 Va. L. Rev. 1648 2008
2008] Doctrinal Feedback and (Un)Reasonable Care
These examples illustrate the general phenomenon described by
John Calfee and Richard Craswell in their classic study of how un-
certainty affects compliance with legal norms. 9 Calfee and
Craswell show that a rational actor will undercomply with an am-
biguous norm when (1) the benefit incurred from undercompliance
is substantial and (2) the chance of avoiding liability is high even
when the norm is violated." On the other hand, a rational actor will
overcomply when (1) significant costs may arise even when the
ambiguous norm is met and (2) the cost of overcompliance is com-
paratively small." In the latter circumstance, the cost of doing more
than the norm requires is less than the cost that comes with a legal
violation, even when the latter is discounted to account for the
chance that the actor would escape liability without overcomplying.
Note that two key ingredients inform these departures from
compliant practice. First, as we have seen, the applicable legal
norm must be ambiguous. This ingredient will be present in a great
many contexts. Even norms that seem clear in the abstract, like a
speed limit, can be uncertain in enforcement. And legal norms are
often not clear even in the abstract, as in the many instances in
which the law uses a standard rather than a rule. Indeed, the im-
precision inherent in a standard is part of its appeal, in that it gives
courts the flexibility they need to arrive at the correct judgment in
fact-dependent contexts. Tort's reasonable care standard, for ex-
ample, is often cited as a prime example of this trade-off between
ex ante uncertainty and ex post accuracy.2 The flexibility of stan-
"John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance
with Legal Standards, 70 Va. L. Rev. 965, 966-67 (1984). A number of scholars have
subsequently expanded on Calfee and Craswell's theme. See, e.g., Giuseppe Dari-
Mattiacci, Errors and the Functioning of Tort Liability, 13 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 165,
165 (2005); Eric A. Posner, Probability Errors: Some Positive and Normative Implica-
tions for Tort and Contract Law, 11 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 125, 125 (2004); Stephen
Marks, Discontinuities, Causation, and Grady's Uncertainty Theorem, 23 J. Legal
Stud. 287, 299-301 (1994); Jason Scott Johnston, Uncertainty, Chaos, and the Torts
Process: An Economic Analysis of Legal Form, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 341, 341-48 (1991).
"' Calfee & Craswell, supra note 19, at 981.
21 Id.
2 See Hart, supra note 4, at 129 (citing reasonable care as the most famous example
of when the inadequacy of ex ante rulemaking warrants giving courts discretion over
case's proper outcome); Prosser and Keeton, supra note 3, § 32, at 173 ("[T]he infinite
variety of situations which may arise makes it impossible to fix definite rules in ad-
vance for all conceivable human conduct."); Neil MacCormick, Reasonableness and
Objectivity, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1575, 1587 (1999) ("The very thing that justifies
1.649
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dards can therefore come in handy, but it also creates room for
doctrinal feedback to operate.
The second ingredient in departures from compliant behavior is
the varying costs and benefits that such departures generate. These
come in two flavors: legal and extralegal. The law imposes costs on
those who are found to have undercomplied (including those who
did not actually undercomply but who were erroneously captured
by the inherent ambiguity in the compliance determination). Those
governed by an ambiguous legal norm will obviously weigh the
amount of such costs and the likelihood that they will be imposed.
When these legal costs and benefits are the main motivator in
prompting departures from compliance, we have what one might
call a "tight" feedback loop: the legal norm not only incorporates
the departures into its definition, but is also largely responsible for
creating them in the first place.
But overcompliance and undercompliance also depend on extra-
legal costs and benefits, such as those generated by the market-
place or social norms.23 The benefit of getting one's wife to the
hospital before the baby is born is independent of the system of le-
gal sanctions that speed limits represent. If a teenage driver gains
status among his peers when he drives eighty miles per hour, that
kind of reward for undercompliance will enter into his decision
whether to exceed the speed limit." These sorts of extralegal fac-
tors will sometimes create the same incentives as their legal coun-
terparts-e.g., both will encourage overcompliance or undercom-
pliance-but other times they may work at cross-purposes. And
even if both point in the same direction, we will have a more com-
plicated, less "tight" feedback loop when the legal considerations
exert little influence and extralegal factors exert a lot.
the law's recourse to such a complex standard as reasonableness... is the existence of
topics or foci of concern to which a plurality of value-laden factors is relevant in a
context-dependent way.").
23 Cf. Glen 0. Robinson, Rethinking the Allocation of Medical Malpractice Risks
Between Patients and Providers, 49 Law & Contemp. Probs., Spring 1986, at 173, 178
(discussing market constraints on overcompliance).
One might even hypothesize a feedback loop in which there is no ambiguity in
definition or enforcement of the norm. For example, if persistent overcompliance or
undercompliance is mainly extralegal in origin-i.e., the specter of liability plays little
motivational role-feedback would still occur as long as the norm incorporates real-
world practice.
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Finally, we must account for two other considerations, which af-
fect both the ambiguity of the legal norm and the accompanying
cost-benefit calculus. First, Calfee and Craswell assume risk neu-
trality on the part of those to whom the ambiguous norm applies.'
If we relax this assumption, however, noncompliant behavior can
become even more prevalent. A risk-averse driver will drive more
slowly, and a risk-seeking driver will drive more quickly.26 Second,
those weighing the wisdom of compliance may have imperfect in-
formation. A driver who underestimates the risk or costs of detec-
tion and punishment will tend to drive faster, and a driver who ex-
aggerates that risk or those costs will tend to drive slower. Risk
tolerance and imperfect information therefore play a role in
whether and to what extent otherwise rational actors depart from
the law's requirements.27
C. Confluence
We have now seen that legal norms often draw their definition
from the real-world practices of those they govern. We have also
seen why and when rational actors would depart from such a norm.
Neither of these two observations is particularly surprising in and
of itself. Combined, however, they produce the underappreciated
phenomenon of doctrinal feedback.
To understand how that combination occurs, begin with the de-
partures from compliance that Calfee and Craswell predict. Their
model paints a picture of a static phenomenon, which the law
might address by changing the ambiguous norm itself-e.g., setting
it at a less-than-optimal level when systemic overcompliance is
likely, so that the actual behavior of those governed will more
25 Calfee & Craswell, supra note 19, at 984.
26 For a mathematical proof of this intuitive observation, see Calfee and Craswell's
follow-up article: Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Le-
gal Standards, 2 J.L. Econ. & Org. 279,300-01 (1986).
27 In some contexts, risk tolerance may provide the entire explanation for feedback.
For example, Calfee and Craswell's model does not explain the prevalence of over-
compliance in intellectual property licensing, because their model assumes that the
regulated actors can choose their level of compliance from a continuum of conduct.
See Calfee & Craswell, supra note 19, at 967. In contrast, intellectual property licens-
ing tends to be an either/or proposition. We must therefore look beyond Calfee and
Craswell's model to explain excess licensing in intellectual property, and risk aversion
provides an answer. See Gibson, supra note 6, at 891-95.
1651
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closely approximate the optimal goal.28 Then introduce into this
mix a legal norm that not only is ambiguous but also incorporates
the practices of those to whom it applies. Now one can see that sys-
temic overcompliance (or undercompliance) has a dynamic aspect
as well: the real-world departures from compliant conduct feed
back into the legal standard itself, causing it to become more (or
less) demanding. This heightened (or lowered) standard then
prompts a new round of overcompliant (or undercompliant) be-
havior, which again causes the legal standard to ratchet up (or
down), and so, forth. In such circumstances, setting the standard at
any particular level will be a stopgap solution at best, because the
standard will inevitably evolve on its own.
So if the costs of a speeding ticket are high, the gains to be had
from speeding are small, and the enforcement is unpredictable,
then not only will drivers drive more slowly than the law requires-
the overcompliance that Calfee and Craswell predict-but any
speed limit that adjusts to reflect average speeds will slowly but
surely get lower and lower. Inversely, if speeding tickets are rarely
issued, or cost drivers little, and the gains to be had from speeding
are great, then not only will drivers speed but our hypothetical self-
adjusting speed limit will slowly but surely creep higher and higher.
Of course, the notion of a self-adjusting speed limit is farcical-but
as we have already seen, a wide variety of existing legal norms ex-
hibit the two feedback-fueling characteristics of ambiguity and ref-
erence to real-world practice. 9
This feedback effect has important implications for theorists who
put their faith in the collective wisdom of individual decisions. For
example, Richard Posner and Richard Epstein both argue for def-
erence to custom when a dispute arises from consensual arrange-
ments?° Epstein has been the foremost proponent of this view; his
theory is that custom reflects market efficiencies, particularly when
it emerges from voluntary interactions among repeat players, be-
cause such transactions create a natural incentive to work together
8 Calfee & Craswell, supra note 19, at 998.29 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 7-15.
30 Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 171-72 (6th ed. 2003); Richard A.
Epstein, The Path to The T.J. Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom in the Law
of Tort, 21 J. Legal Stud. 1, 4-6 (1992).
1652 [Vol. 94:1641
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and consider each other's interests." In contrast, a court's top-
down cost-benefit judgment has no such "built-in tendency to reli-
ability," suffering instead from "inferior knowledge and a weaker
incentive to get things right. 3 2 In such circumstances, the argument
goes, courts should not second-guess industry practice or interfere
with its development; as Epstein says, "nothing kills the emergence
of custom like the active intervention of an external legal system
replete with its own extensive norms and powerful vested inter-
ests.
33
What doctrinal feedback shows us, however, is that the very
conditions that seem to support using custom as the legal norm can
actually make it particularly unsuitable. Custom is most likely to
emerge as an independent, guiding force when the law is vague-
when there is a normative vacuum to be filled . Yet we have seen
that a legal standard that defers to custom can create systemic de-
partures from efficient behavior and then allow those departures to
infect custom (and the law that defers to it) with their inefficien-
cies. And this danger exists even if everyone is acting rationally;
imperfect information and variations in risk tolerance simply make
it worse. In short, when feedback is present, individual choice pro-
duces folly, not wisdom.
II. REASONABLE CARE AND MEDICAL CARE
The foregoing discussion reveals that doctrinal feedback may
have explanatory power in a wide variety of legal contexts. Yet this
breadth of application and the many disparate factors that enter
into the feedback model make it difficult to move from generaliza-
tions to specific predictions without an in-depth examination of the
applicable legal norm and the community it governs. Different le-
gal regimes will defer to real-world practice in different ways. The
legal and extralegal costs and benefits of departures from compli-
ance will vary from industry to industry. Different actors may have
different levels of risk tolerance and differing access to accurate in-
3' Epstein, supra note 30, at 11-12.
12 Id. at 24.
Id. at 14.
As Epstein points out, "[i]ndividual actors need a high level of certainty in their
ordinary affairs, and that certainty cannot come from probabilistic judgments or deli-
cate evaluations about borderline cases." Id. at 7.
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formation. For example, our hypothetical community of drivers
may be heterogeneous: some may be risk-averse, others risk-
seeking; some may have much to gain from speeding, others little;
some may believe that enforcement of the speed limit is infrequent
and forgiving, others may believe the opposite. If so, then a critical
mass of overcompliance or undercompliance may never occur.
Therefore, the feedback model cannot by itself predict exactly
when there will be a sufficient level of overcompliance or under-
compliance in a given industry to feed back into and change the
governing norm. To see doctrinal feedback in operation, we must
identify a particular setting-one in which an ambiguous legal
norm both governs and refers to real-world practice, in which the
role of legal and extralegal influences on behavior has been meas-
ured, and in which we can get some sense of how practice has
evolved over time.
One promising candidate presents itself: medical care and the
medical malpractice law that governs it. The potential for doctrinal
feedback is certainly present here. Like the negligence law of
which it is a subset, medical malpractice uses tort's ambiguous rea-
sonable care standard. But as we will see below, courts defer more
to real-world practice in medical malpractice than in other negli-
gence contexts, which lowers the chance that other policymaking
inputs will inform the legal norm and thus retard the feedback ef-
fect. Moreover, medical malpractice is an extensively well-
researched field; there is a rich theoretical and empirical literature
on the strength and effectiveness of the tort signal, on how legal
norms affect the behavior and motivations of those they govern,
and on how physicians perceive and respond to risk. Let us turn,
then, to an analysis of how feedback affects the world of medical
care.
A. Tort Law's Feedback Potential
Tort law's well-known reasonable care standard shows obvious
potential for doctrinal feedback. First, it refers to the real-world
practice of those whom it regulates, requiring them to exercise
"ordinary prudence" and exhorting them to do what a "reasonable
person" would do in their place.35 Such an inquiry necessarily looks
" Prosser and Keeton, supra note 3, § 32, at 174.
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to what people usually do in similar circumstances. 6 Therefore,
even if "reasonable care" implies somewhat more careful and pru-
dent behavior than that of the average person, it is nonetheless
grounded in everyday behavior. Second, the boundaries of legal li-
ability under the reasonable care standard are ambiguous from an
ex ante perspective, both because of the uncertainty inherent in the
term "ordinary care" and because of the vicissitudes of the jury sys-
tem that decides tort cases.
So a shopkeeper who wants to avoid the gray area of negligence
liability for slip-and-fall accidents might provide more care than his
peers (e.g., extra handrails and cushy carpets) so that even if an ac-
cident occurs, he will be viewed as having more than satisfied the
negligence norm. Or perhaps he would overcomply not out of fear
of liability, but because of extralegal motivations; maybe extra
handrails and cushy carpets attract more customers. In either case,
if other shopkeepers do the same, then reasonable care will follow,
drawing its definition from the practices of those it regulates.
To determine whether the reality of negligence law reflects this
feedback potential, however, we must examine how well it fits into
the particulars of the feedback model. How much does reasonable
care actually defer to real-world practice? What are the costs and
benefits-both legal and extralegal-of departing from compliant
behavior?
As it turns out, neither of these important issues admits of useful
generalizations, even within the negligence context. Take the def-
erence issue: the conduct of the regulated parties certainly matters
in determining what qualifies as reasonable care, but courts may
also substitute their own judgment. As Learned Hand famously
proclaimed in The T.J Hooper:
There are, no doubt, cases where courts seem to make the gen-
eral practice of the calling the standard of proper diligence; we
have indeed given some currency to the notion ourselves. Indeed
in most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common prudence;
but strictly it is never its measure; a whole calling may have un-
duly lagged in the adoption of new and available devices. It never
may set its own tests, however persuasive be its usages. Courts
must in the end say what is required; there are precautions so
36 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283 (1965).
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imperative that even their universal disregard will not excuse
their omission. 7
Under this top-down approach, a court may independently deter-
mine the optimal cost-benefit balance that reasonable care repre-
sents, even if the affected industry's universal practice is overcom-
pliant or undercompliant therewith.38 The conduct of the ordinary
person is therefore relevant, but not dispositive, and overcompli-
ance or undercompliance-even if pervasive-will not always be
the main determinant of the legal norm.39
Likewise, there are no universal truths regarding the risks and
rewards of providing more or less care than the reasonable care
standard demands. Tort's deterrent signal will be weak in some in-
dustries but strong in others. The cost of providing more care and
the savings from providing less will also vary considerably, as will
the extralegal incentives to depart from compliance.
This is not to say that doctrinal feedback plays no role in the
evolution of tort law. To the contrary, the feedback phenomenon
will likely have some explanatory power-perhaps a great deal of
explanatory power-over the legal standard in a wide variety of
negligence contexts. But to figure out when it does so, we must ex-
amine particular settings in which negligence law applies and
measure the effect of the various feedback factors therein. Unfor-
tunately, in the space of a single article it is impossible to under-
take a comprehensive inquiry into the many industries that operate
in the shadow of reasonable care. We shall have to make do with
one case study: medical care.
B. Deference to Custom in Medical Malpractice Law
Consider again the example of the physician confronted with a
swollen lymph node. The ingredients for overcompliance seem to
be present here: she is operating under the famously ambiguous
60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932) (citations omitted).
3 This discussion-and indeed this entire Article-assumes that optimal care in a
negligence setting tracks Learned Hand's classic cost-benefit standard. See United
States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
" Note that Judge Hand's principle is not without its critics. See supra text accom-
panying notes 30-33.
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reasonable care standard;' providing reasonable care does not
eliminate the danger (and very high cost) of cancer; and overcom-
pliance-i.e., ordering the ultrasound-costs her little. In those cir-
cumstances, taking the extra precaution is the rational choice. And
if other physicians follow suit, ordering an ultrasound will become
customary practice, even though everyone knows it is wasteful. The
negligence standard will then recognize the procedure as part of
providing reasonable care to patients with swollen lymph nodes,
making the benchmark for compliance (and overcompliance) more
demanding. This means that the rational physician must do even
more to overcomply-e.g., order a biopsy-and the cycle begins
anew.
To determine whether the assumptions underlying our physician
example represent prevailing practice in the medical world, how-
ever, we must examine feedback's two formative factors. The first
is whether the applicable legal doctrine incorporates real-world
practice. Here the answer is an emphatic yes. Courts that adjudi-
cate medical malpractice claims have not accepted Judge Hand's
invitation to second-guess industry custom. Instead, they defer al-
most without exception to the real-world practice of physicians.4'
Reasonable care in malpractice cases "is virtually defined by the
customary skills and practices of the profession," such that compli-
40 See, e.g., Jeffrey O'Connell, Neo-No-Fault Remedies for Medical Injuries: Coor-
dinated Statutory and Contractual Alternatives, 49 Law & Contemp. Probs., Spring
1986, at 125, 125 ("Suits to recover for personal injuries resulting from medical mal-
practice can be among the most unpredictable and most complex to litigate.").
4 A rare counterexample is Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974), one of the
only cases ever cited for the proposition that a court can substitute its own judgment
for that of the medical profession. In Helling, the Washington Supreme Court held an
ophthalmologist liable for failure to perform a simple test for glaucoma, despite un-
controverted evidence that the standards of the profession did not require administer-
ing the test to younger patients. The profession's practice reflected a perfectly reason-
able cost-benefit analysis: only one in 25,000 patients under forty would have the
condition. Id. at 983. Indeed, the test's cost-effectiveness was seriously in doubt even
for older patients, see Clark C. Havighurst, Private Reform of Tort-Law Dogma:
Market Opportunities and Legal Obstacles, 49 Law & Contemp. Probs., Spring 1986,
at 143, 159 n.45, and yet a post-Helling analysis indicated that the expert testimony
was wrong-that a high percentage of ophthalmologists had been screening younger
patients for glaucoma. Jerry Wiley, The Impact of Judicial Decisions on Professional
Conduct: An Empirical Study, 55 S. Cal. L. Rev. 345, 383 (1982). Rather than put a
stop to inefficient practices, then, the court's decision promoted them.
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ance with custom almost always means no liability." Indeed, this
deference is so strong that a court can actually exclude evidence
that challenges the effectiveness of the custom. 3
In recent years, some jurisdictions have departed slightly from
the deferential standard, but few would deny that custom remains
the central determinant of liability in medical malpractice. Indeed,
the soon-to-be-released Third Restatement of Torts has not noted
any diminution in its importance; although in most cases the Re-
statement sees reasonable care as "more demanding than a stan-
dard understood solely in terms of ordinary care," the distinction is
evanescent in professional malpractice cases, where "the malprac-
tice standard is to a significant extent defined in terms of profes-
sional standards and customs.""
Deference to medical custom gets complicated only when physi-
cians disagree about the appropriate treatment. In such instances,
the practice among a "respectable minority" of physicians can pro-
vide a safe haven from liability. This defense is far from universal
across jurisdictions, however, 5 and in practice it usually results in
nothing more than an additional jury instruction. The respectable
minority rule therefore provides some more firepower in the "bat-
tle of experts" that usually occurs in such cases,46 but does little to
reduce the inherent ambiguity of the liability determination or as-
42 Robinson, supra note 23, at 173 (emphasis omitted); accord Epstein, supra note
30, at 37; Clark C. Havighurst, Altering the Applicable Standard of Care, 49 Law &
Contemp. Probs., Spring 1986, at 265, 265-66.4' E.g., Schneider v. Revici, 817 F.2d 987, 990 (2d Cir. 1987) (affirming exclusion of
effectiveness evidence because "the issue in medical malpractice is not whether a par-
ticular treatment is effective but whether that treatment is a deviation from accepted
medical practice in the community").
"Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm § 13 cmts. a-b (Pro-
posed Final Draft No. 1 2005). But see Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of
Deference to Custom: Malpractice Law at the Millennium, 57 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
163,204-05 (2000).
41 See Leonard J. Nelson III, The Defense of Malpractice Claims, in 1 Medical Mal-
practice 9.05[3] (David W. Louisell & Harold Williams eds., 2007) (listing jurisdic-
tions that have and have not adopted some form of rule); Anna C. Mastroianni, Li-
ability, Regulation and Policy in Surgical Innovation: The Cutting Edge of Research
and Therapy, 16 Health Matrix 351, 382-83 (2006) (same); Joan P. Dailey, Comment,
The Two Schools of Thought and Informed Consent Doctrines in Pennsylvania: A
Model for Integration, 98 Dick. L. Rev. 713, 721-22 (1994) (discussing jurisdictions
that reject the rule and their rationales for doing so).
46 Mark A. Hall, The Defensive Effect of Medical Practice Policies in Malpractice
Litigation, 54 Law & Contemp. Probs., Winter-Spring 1991, at 119, 128-29.
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sure physicians of the wisdom of departing from a dominant prac-
tice.47
In the end, then, deference to custom is both widespread and
critically important to doctrinal feedback in that it ensures that the
legal system will be in no position to remove a widely adopted yet
wasteful practice. Quite the contrary: deference to custom means
that once an unneeded medical practice becomes widespread, that
practice also becomes the legal standard by which physicians are
judged-which encourages the remaining outliers to adopt the
practice as well.48 Eventually, that which was once considered over-
compliant becomes merely compliant, so that physicians who want
to steer clear of reasonable care's gray areas must adopt some new,
even-more-overcautious measure."
C. Departures from Compliance
The other formative feedback factor focuses on departures from
the level of care that the legal norm demands. Do physicians actu-
ally overcomply, or undercomply? If so, why? And is there evi-
dence that such departures from compliance actually feed back
into the reasonable care standard?
The first part of this inquiry is easy: there is clear evidence of
such departures in medical care. They take the form of overcom-
pliance (more procedures, more tests, more referrals, and so forth)
and the specter of malpractice liability is a prime motivating factor.
The practice of providing extra care-not because the physician
considers it clinically justified, but because of a fear of increased
malpractice exposure-is known as defensive medicine, and it has
been the subject of considerable study since the first medical mal-
'7 Peters, supra note 44, at 186; see also Kenneth S. Abraham, The Trouble With
Negligence, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1187, 1208 (2001) (predicting variation in application of
respectable minority rule based on its being complicated and possibly "counterintui-
tive to many finders of fact").
48 See Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, Defensive Medicine and
Medical Malpractice 32 (1994); Havighurst, supra note 41, at 158-59; Hall, supra note
46, at 119; David M. Studdert et al., Defensive Medicine Among High-Risk Specialist
Physicians in a Volatile Malpractice Environment, 293 JAMA 2609, 2616 (2005).
' Pervasive undercompliance could theoretically create a feedback cycle in the op-
posite direction, but in reality this is unlikely, for reasons discussed infra, Section I.B.
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practice "crisis" in the 1970s. For example, studies from the 1980s
to today find a significant relationship between perceived risk of
suit and the ordering of more tests and performance of more pro-
cedures ."1
Of course, one would expect physicians to provide more care as
their risk of malpractice liability increases. Such conduct might
represent mere compliance, not overcompliance. Subsequent stud-
ies have therefore focused on truly defensive provision of care, i.e.,
measures that physicians take despite acknowledging their clinical
inadvisability and cost inefficiency. The evidence here is compel-
ling.52 In one recent survey of six medical specialties, more than
nine out of ten physicians reported practicing this kind of defensive
medicine "sometimes" or "often.''" Similar numbers admitted to
ordering unnecessary tests, and more than six out of ten reported
performing or ordering wasteful invasive procedures." Prescribing
unneeded medications was also quite common.5 And although di-
rect surveys can suffer from the bias that comes with self-
reporting, 6 other methods of studying defensive medicine also
"The practices I describe are more accurately known as "positive defensive medi-
cine." The counterpart is "negative defensive medicine," which involves avoiding
high-risk patients or abandoning risky areas of practice. See Bryan A. Liang, Layper-
son and Physician Perceptions of the Malpractice System: Implications for Patient
Safety, 57 Soc. Sci. & Med. 147, 150-51 (2003).
", Paul C. Weiler et al., A Measure of Malpractice: Medical Injury, Malpractice Liti-
gation, and Patient Compensation 127 (1993); G.L. Birbeck et al., Do Malpractice
Concerns, Payment Mechanisms, and Attitudes Influence Test-Ordering Decisions?,
62 Neurology 119, 121 (2004).
52 See, e.g., Nonda Wilson & Albert L. Strunk, Editorial, Overview of the 2006
ACOG Survey on Professional Liability, ACOG Clinical Rev., Mar.-Apr. 2007, at 1,
15 (noting that 64.6% of obstetricians and gynecologists reported making changes to
their practice due to malpractice fears); Studdert et al., supra note 48, at 2609; Paul
Clay Sorum et al., Why Do Primary Care Physicians in the United States and France
Order Prostate-Specific Antigen Tests for Asymptomatic Patients?, 23 Med. Decision
Making 301, 307 (2003) (finding positive correlation between physicians' malpractice
fears and ordering of an unnecessary prostate test).
5 Studdert et al., supra note 48, at 2612.
, Id. at 2616.
55Id. at 2612.
56 See Office of Technology Assessment, supra note 48, at 74 (1994) (suggesting that
surveys that explicitly ask physicians about malpractice considerations "considerably
overestimate the extent of defensive medicine" on the theory that the very mention of
such considerations can prompt respondents to exaggerate them). It is unclear, how-
ever, why respondents would not be equally likely to downplay defensive medicine as
inconsistent with their commitment to medical necessity and their integrity as physi-
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show that the phenomenon is quite real.57
Physicians' attitudes toward risk can also affect the incidence of
defensive medicine and the feedback effect that it fuels. As dis-
cussed above, overcompliance should be even more common when
those governed by an ambiguous standard are risk averse. Studies
have borne this out: risk aversion explains the higher costs per pa-
tient that certain physicians generate,58 and risk-averse practitio-
ners tend to order more tests, make more referrals, and hospitalize
more patients. 9 One study focused specifically on the role of mal-
practice fears, finding that those emergency room doctors who
most feared lawsuits were significantly more likely to admit even
low-risk patients (rather than treat them as outpatients, which is
generally regarded as safe) and to order more referrals and test-
ing.'
cians. Moreover, if the surveyed physicians were not told that malpractice considera-
tions are a focus of the survey, they might answer as if the survey were a medical
board exam-i.e., based on clinical assessments only-even though in real life they
would consider malpractice pressures as well. See id. at 63.
57 E.g., David Klingman et al., Measuring Defensive Medicine Using Clinical Sce-
nario Surveys, 21 J. Health Pol. Pol'y & L. 185, 191-92 (1996); A. Russell Localio et
al., Relationship Between Malpractice Claims and Cesarean Delivery, 269 JAMA 366
(1993); Robert Quinn, Medical Malpractice Insurance: The Reputation Effect and
Defensive Medicine, 65 J. Risk & Ins. 467, 467 (1998); see also Havighurst, supra note
41, at 267 ("Much care that physicians perceive as 'defensive medicine' appears to be
a response to the pressure to do more than individual professionals believe to be nec-
essary and cost-justified."); Laurence R. Tancredi & Jeremiah A. Barondess, The
Problem of Defensive Medicine, 200 Science 879, 880 (1978) (noting that physicians
admitted overuse of common procedure without consciously relating it to fear of li-
ability). Note that the overall costs of defensive medicine are a subject of some de-
bate. See Office of Technology Assessment, supra note 48, at 154-59 (critiquing stud-
ies that peg costs at billions of dollars annually).
58 Kevin Fiscella et al., Risk Aversion and Costs: A Comparison of Family Physi-
cians and General Internists, 49 J. Fam. Prac. 12 (2000).
" Id. at 16 (citing multiple studies); Susan Dorr Goold et al., Measuring Physician
Attitudes Toward Cost, Uncertainty, Malpractiee, and Utilization Review, 9 J. Gen.
Internal Med. 544, 544 (1994) (finding that "discomfort from uncertainty" and fear of
malpractice positively correlated with each other and with increased resource use);
Steven D. Pearson et al., Triage Decisions for Emergency Department Patients with
Chest Pain: Do Physicians' Risk Attitudes Make the Difference?, 10 J. Gen. Internal
Med. 557, 557 (1995) (finding correlation between decreased risk tolerance and in-
creased admission of patients with chest pain); Sorum et al., supra note 52, at 307
(finding that physicians' "discomfort with uncertainty" predicted ordering of unneces-
sary prostate test).
60 David A. Katz et al., Emergency Physicians' Fear of Malpractice in Evaluating
Patients With Possible Acute Cardiac Ischemia, 46 Annals Emergency Med. 525, 525
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Perhaps more significant than risk aversion is physicians' risk
perception. Doctrinal feedback will be even more likely if those
governed by the negligence standard have imperfect information
that causes them to exaggerate the likelihood of being held liable,
because then they will take even greater pains to avoid falling
within reasonable care's gray area. On this issue, the medical pro-
fession is nearly off the charts. Physicians overestimate their over-
all chances of being sued by a factor of three, 6' and they think that
a negligently injured patient is thirty times more likely to file suit
than is actually the case.62 When asked to forecast the outcome in
real malpractice cases, physicians are overly pessimistic about the
defendants' chances, predicting defendant verdicts correctly only
thirty-six percent of the time63 and inaccurately assuming that er-
rors in legal outcomes will overwhelmingly favor plaintiffs.6 Given
these exaggerated perceptions of risk, it should come as no surprise
that physicians admit to providing an excessive level of care.
So far, then, we have evidence of a tight feedback loop, where
the law does most of the heavy lifting. In other words, the reason-
able care standard not only incorporates overcompliance into its
definition, but is also largely responsible for creating that over-
compliance in the first place. But to close the loop (so to speak),
we need to examine the extralegal influences on the cost-benefit
calculus that underlies physician behavior. Obviously factors other
than fear of malpractice liability inform the choices that physicians
make about patient care. If these other considerations mitigate the
(2005); accord Ann G. Lawthers et al., Physicians' Perceptions of the Risk of Being
Sued, 17 J. Health Pol. Pol'y & L. 463, 471-72 (1992) (finding positive correlation be-
tween physicians' perceived risk of being sued and ordering of additional tests).
6 Lawthers et al., supra note 60, at 469. The overestimation was higher in high-risk
specialties and lower in low-risk specialties, but all specialties overestimated. Id. at
468.
62 Id. at 468, 475.
63 Liang, supra note 50, at 149.
' The study's subjects were asked to assess both whether proper care was provided
and what the verdict would be. By combining these assessments, the study showed
how often physicians would predict error in the legal system (i.e., a jury verdict incon-
sistent with the level of care provided) and which party the error would favor. The
physicians' predicted an error rate of approximately one in seven (14.68%), but more
significant was their prediction that 85% of the errors would favor the plaintiff-i.e.,
that the jury would find for the plaintiff even when the defendant had provided
proper care. Id. at 150. Here again perception is at odds with reality; error in malprac-
tice cases actually favors defendants. See sources cited infra note 225.
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tendency to overcomply, then the feedback potential is diminished.
As it turns out, however, the extralegal factors will either produce
the same result-i.e., wasteful levels of care-or at least will not
significantly impede overcompliance.
Among the various extralegal considerations, first and foremost
is the medical profession's desire to improve the health of those it
serves. One would hope that that goal would be paramount in any
clinical decision, even if tort's deterrent signal were entirely absent.
What this means for doctrinal feedback, however, is simply that a
physician will overcomply in ways that do no direct harm to pa-
tients' health (e.g., by ordering additional tests); the injury, if any,
is merely to their pocketbooks. In other words, one of the costs
that the physician will consider is the added exposure that might
come with added care; no physician is going to think that perform-
ing a dangerous procedure will help avoid liability.65
A related extralegal factor is the efficacy of added care in im-
proving health outcomes. For example, if empirical evidence
clearly indicates the uselessness of an additional test, the conscien-
tious physician will think twice before ordering it-even if the test
helps reduce exposure in the legal arena. Physicians will rarely con-
front this dilemma, however, because of a surprising (and some-
what disappointing) feature of medical care: most medical practices
have little or no support in the scientific literature. Instead, physi-
cians do what they see other physicians do, or what they were
taught in medical school.66 Even more disillusioning is that when
65 This explains why juries' normality bias (i.e., their tendency to punish departures
from conventional procedure) will have little effect on doctrinal feedback. See Robert
A. Prentice & Jonathan J. Koehler, A Normality Bias in Legal Decision Making, 88
Cornell L. Rev. 583, 626-27 (2003) (showing normality bias among medical malprac-
tice juries). If the overcompliance that fuels doctrinal feedback causes no injury to pa-
tients' health, juries will have no opportunity to exhibit any bias against the adoption
of the extra precautions. (Indeed, if normality bias has any effect here, it will be to
contribute to the feedback cycle: once the new precautions have become the norm,
juries will be more likely to assign liability to the few stragglers who stick to the old
method, even though it is equally safe.) For the same reason, tort law's anti-
innovation bias, see Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, The Anti-Innovation Bias
of Tort Law (U. Pa. Inst. for L & Econ., Research Paper No. 07-31, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1028346, will not significantly retard the development and
use of these extra precautions, because only those innovations that cause injury will
come before juries and allow custom to rope them in.
66 Shannon Brownlee, Overtreated: Why Too Much Medicine Is Making Us Sicker
and Poorer 27 (2007); Lucian L. Leape et al., What Practices Will Most Improve
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scientific evidence becomes available-e.g., randomized clinical
trials of a common procedure-those in the field often remain ig-
norant of or misapply the results.67 This means that even a single-
minded focus on patient welfare will not eliminate overcompliance
or slow down the feedback loop. In most cases, physicians are free
to order more tests, make more referrals, and so forth, without
feeling that they are ignoring or compromising their patients'
health.68
For similar reasons, physicians often accede to patients' de-
mands for particular tests or procedures. Perhaps the added meas-
ure is wasteful, but unless it actually leads to a worse outcome, why
not say yes? 69 Moreover, a patient whose demand for additional
treatment is refused is probably more likely to sue (and may also
be more likely to prevail, if the refused procedure would have
mitigated the injury)." The desire to be accommodating and the
desire to avoid liability thus combine to produce even more un-
needed care-more fuel for the feedback fire."1
Safety?, 288 JAMA 501, 506 (2002); William M. Sage, Regulating Through Informa-
tion: Disclosure Laws and American Health Care, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1701, 1774
(1999); Tancredi & Barondess, supra note 57, at 881.
67Lars Noah, Medicine's Epistemology: Mapping the Haphazard Diffusion of
Knowledge in the Biomedical Community, 44 Ariz. L. Rev. 373, 383 (2002); Sage, su-
pra note 66, at 1774.
Indeed, overcompliance probably improves patient outcomes much of the time,
even though it is not cost-effective. Studdert et al., supra note 48, at 2616. There are,
however, instances in which defensive medicine actually makes the patient worse. Id.
at 2616; see also Michael L. DeKay & David A. Asch, Is the Defensive Use of Diag-
nostic Tests Good for Patients, or Bad?, 18 Med. Decision Making 19 (1998) (arguing
that defensive diagnostic testing is bad for patients).
9 It is often easier to just say "yes" than to explain why "no" is the better answer.
See Brownlee, supra note 66, at 157-58; cf. Dustin W. Ballard et al., Fear of Litigation
May Increase Resuscitation of Infants Born Near the Limits of Viability, 140 J. Pedi-
atrics 713 (2002) (finding that neonatologists strongly deferred to parents' wishes re-
garding resuscitation of premature infants with dismal survival rates); Sorum et al.,
supra note 52, at 304-305 (finding that American physicians felt more pressure from
patients and ordered more unnecessary tests than their French counterparts).
70 Cf. Ballard et al., supra note 69, at 716 (finding that perception of parents' liti-
giousness prompted neonatologists to "resuscitate infants against their better judg-
ment" and that "parents are assumed to be potentially litigious until proven other-
wise").
71 See Eric G. Campbell et al., Professionalism in Medicine: Results of a National
Survey of Physicians, 147 Annals Internal Med. 795, 799 (2007) ("In response to a hy-
pothetical scenario about the distribution of finite resources, 36% of physicians said
that they would order unneeded magnetic resonance imaging for back pain in re-
1664
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Another factor in the cycle of overcompliance is the availability
of overcompliance options, compounded by the forces within the
industry that promote their use. It is not enough for a physician to
want to provide extra care; he or she must actually have available
some form of extra care-some incremental measure that comes at
a low cost and that reduces the chance of liability. If the only
treatment options available are those that are already part of the
customary care standard, or if the "extra care" alternatives are all
high-cost, then the feedback loop will never get started; the cost of
overcompliance will be too high.
This factor obviously depends on the particular condition being
treated and the state of medical care at the time, but there is good
reason to believe that the physician will often have overcompliance
options. The many forms that extra care can take (referrals, tests,
hospitalizations, prescriptions, procedures, etc.) and the rapid de-
velopment and diffusion of new medical technologies will combine
to provide plenty of ways to do a bit more than reasonable care
demands. Studies have shown that the availability of medical re-
sources inevitably leads to the use of such resources, with little or
no effect on patient outcomes;7 2 "A built hospital bed is a filled
hospital bed," as the saying goes.73
Moreover, the producers of new technologies and treatments re-
lentlessly market them to health care providers, knowing that no
one expects proof of their efficacy before adoption." Pharmaceuti-
sponse to patient request."). Note that this survey was not about and did not mention
malpractice, meaning that its results are not tainted by the possibility that physicians
exaggerate their propensity to practice defensive medicine because they have a politi-
cal axe to grind. See supra note 56.
72 Brownlee, supra note 66, at 109-16; see also id. at 171 ("[S]tudies of the effective-
ness of imaging.., have shown that the technology is improving care in only tiny in-
crements, even as utilization and costs are rising at meteoric rates."); Studdert et al.,
supra note 48, at 2616 (explaining how "[d]efensive use of technology" inevitably be-
comes customary).
73 Brownlee, supra note 66, at 111; see also Office of Technology Assessment, supra
note 48, at 105 (summarizing studies showing that "availability of technologies influ-
ences their use"); Herman M. Somers, The Malpractice Controversy and the Quality
of Patient Care, 55 Milbank Mem. Fund Q. 193, 228 (1977) (describing "technological
imperative").74 See, e.g., Gina Kolata, Where Marketing and Medicine Meet, N.Y. Times, Feb.
10, 1999, at A14 (discussing marketing of unproven technologies to cardiologists).
Another example:
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cal companies, for example, spend much more on promotional ef-
forts than on research and development, and they supplement di-
rect marketing with sponsorship of educational enterprises and
prizes for everyone from school-age children to practicing physi-
cians.75 In 2006, sixty-one percent of revenue from continuing
medical education programs in the United States came from com-
mercial sources, such as the pharmaceutical and medical device in-
dustries.76 These frequent interactions with for-profit vendors of
new medicines have significant and dismaying consequences for
physicians' prescription rates, knowledge of the effects of medica-
tion, and related matters.77 And it is beyond dispute that the wide-
spread adoption of new medical technologies results from more
than inherent cost-effectiveness; it is influenced by a complex in-
teraction of cultural and practice norms, payment systems, rela-
tions between hospitals and physicians, and other factors.78
So far, all the influences on medical care seem to point in the di-
rection of overcompliance. There is, however, one extralegal factor
that we might expect to prevent physicians from consistently pro-
viding more care than they think necessary: market forces. Each
When Cordis, a manufacturer of cardiovascular stents, introduced the first
drug-coated stent in June 2003, interventional cardiologists began using them
without evidence that they represented an improvement over bare-metal
stents.... Uptake was so widespread and so rapid that by 2006 over 90 percent
of all stents placed in patients were coated. Clinical trials are now showing that
the drug-coated stents increase the risk of a clot, which can cause a stroke,
unless the patient takes drugs to prevent one.
Brownlee, supra note 66, at 172; see also id. at 119-20 (describing tireless promotional
efforts of originator of inefficacious bone marrow transplant surgery for breast can-
cer).
15 Joe Collier & Ike Iheanacho, The Pharmaceutical Industry as an Informant, 360
Lancet 1405, 1407-08 (2002).
76 Barbara E. Barnes et al., A Risk Stratification Tool to Assess Commercial Influ-
ences on Continuing Medical Education, 27 J. Continuing Educ. Health Profs. 234,
234 (2007).
" Ashley Wazana, Physicians and the Pharmaceutical Industry, 283 JAMA 373
(2000); see also Barnes et al., supra note 76, at 234 (noting that continuing medical
education participants "often have difficulty determining the difference between
commercial bias and expert personal opinion"); Weiler et al., supra note 51, at 128
(ranking continuing medical education programs as the most influential factor in de-
ciding what care to provide).78 See, e.g., Hideki Hashimoto et al., The Diffusion of Medical Technology, Local
Conditions, and Technology Re-Invention: A Comparative Case Study on Coronary
Stenting, 79 Health Pol'y 221 (2006).
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extra test, procedure, and referral comes with a price tag, and if its
economic costs outweigh its benefits (as is always the case with de-
fensive medicine) one would expect the market to prevent physi-
cians from ordering it. Of course, as Calfee and Craswell demon-
strate, part of the benefit of the extra care is the decreased risk of
liability-but even for the physician who is averse to or exagger-
ates that risk there may come a point at which it no longer makes
sense to overcomply.
The peculiar nature of the health care industry, however, signifi-
cantly dampens these market pressures. Most patients externalize
their costs through health insurance, and those insurance plans
have not been successful in containing costs generally-let alone
containing the costs of defensive medicine specifically-despite
decades of attempts.9 Indeed, financial incentives probably fuel the
feedback loop rather than retard it. Most physicians work on a fee-
for-service basis, so additional care means additional fees."0 Testing
in particular has long been an especially profitable aspect of health
care.8 We would like to think that the medical profession has only
our health in mind, but unfortunately studies consistently show
that physicians order more tests, procedures, etc., when they stand
to profit personally from them.
The importance of this absence of cost constraints cannot be
overstated, as it allows the various overcompliance motivations to
roam free: risk aversion, imperfect information, patient demands,
promotion of new practices, fear of liability, and so forth. Physi-
71 Patricia M. Danzon, Medical Malpractice: Theory, Evidence, and Public Policy
142 (1985); Posner, supra note 30, at 202 n.4; Weiler et al., supra note 51, at 113; Mi-
chelle M. Mello, Of Swords and Shields: The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in
Medical Malpractice Litigation, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 645, 690 n.197 (2001); Robinson,
sugra note 23, at 178.
Weiler et al., supra note 51, at 113.
81 Brownlee, supra note 66, at 162; Eugene D. Robin, Matters of Life & Death:
Risks vs. Benefits of Medical Care 28 (1984); Somers, supra note 73, at 229 n.40.
2 E.g., Birbeck et al., supra note 51, at 120 (finding evidence that physicians with
financial interest in testing facilities ordered more tests); Bruce J. Hillman et al., Fre-
quency and Costs of Diagnostic Imaging in Office Practice-A Comparison of Self-
Referring and Radiologist-Referring Physicians, 323 New Eng. J. Med. 1604 (1990)
(finding that self-referring physicians order diagnostic imaging four times more often
than radiologist-referring physicians and usually charge significantly more for imaging
of similar complexity); see also Office of Technology Assessment, supra note 48, at
104 (summarizing similar studies).
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cians relieved of economic pressures can therefore almost always
find a reason to order one more test or make one more referral.83
For example, they can (and often do) pursue diagnostic clarity
even when learning the nature of the patient's ailment will not
change the course of treatment or affect outcome-for example, by
performing a cancer biopsy on an aged patient even when her
health is too fragile for surgery or chemotherapy.'
Of course, when it comes to externalization of costs, one cannot
look at just one side of the ledger. Doctors and patients may not
bear the full cost of the medical treatment they agree upon, but
neither do physicians pay for their own malpractice exposure. In-
stead, malpractice insurance covers most of their costs. In theory,
this should muffle tort's deterrent signal, reduce overcompliance,
and slow down the feedback effect.
Why then is defensive medicine so pervasive? One possibility is
that malpractice insurers efficiently pass the deterrent signal along
by adjusting their premiums to account for the level of care their
policyholders provide. But the evidence does not bear this out:
physicians are almost always rated by community-i.e., type of
practice and geographical location-rather than by claims experi-
ence,85 and providing too much care will not change the community
to which a physician belongs.
The more compelling explanation for the persistence of defen-
sive medicine in the face of malpractice insurance is that uninsured
costs loom large in the psyche of the average physician. We have
already seen that physicians exaggerate the risk of suit, but the re-
search literature also emphasizes the great mental distress that the
malpractice process imposes on a physician, as well as the signifi-
" See Robin, supra note 81, at 40 ("It is easier for doctors to come up with a justifi-
cation for doing a given test than for not doing it.").
' See id. at 19-22, 28-35; Elliott S. Fisher & H. Gilbert Welch, Avoiding the Unin-
tended Consequences of Growth in Medical Care, 281 JAMA 446, 447 (1999); see
also sources cited supra note 59 (discussing physicians' discomfort with uncertainty).
" Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medical Liability and the Evo-
lution of the American Health Care System, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 381, 409-10 (1994);
David M. Studdert et al., Medical Malpractice, 350 New Eng. J. Med. 283, 283 (2004).
The reason that experience rating is not more common is that claims against any
given physician are too few and far between and fluctuate too much to generate
meaningful actuarial data. Abraham & Weiler, supra, at 410; Troyen A. Brennan &
Michelle M. Mello, Patient Safety and Medical Malpractice: A Case Study, 139 An-
nals Internal Med. 267, 271 (2003).
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cant reputational effects and thousands of dollars' worth of lost
time and inconvenience that accompany each claim.86 And most of
these costs arise from the mere filing of a claim, 7 which means they
foster overcompliance even when the plaintiff is unlikely to prevail
at trial or extract a settlement payment. Once we combine the de-
terrent effect of these uninsured costs with the fact that providing
extra care costs the patient nothing (and may put money in the
physician's pocket), the prevalence of defensive medicine makes
sense and the feedback potential lives on.
D. Systemic Shifts
So far, we have a legal norm that defers to custom and a variety
of reasons for that custom to exceed the minimum standard that
negligence law demands. For such excessive care to feed back into
the negligence standard, however, it must be systemic; a critical
mass of physicians must adopt the practice at issue or it will never
become custom and thus will never affect the applicable legal
norm.
This does not mean, however, that all the physicians who adopt
the overcompliant practice need to share the same motivation.
Some might overcomply out of fear of liability, others because they
have been bamboozled by marketing efforts, and still others be-
cause they stand to profit from providing more care. Whatever the
explanation, as long as the total number of physicians providing the
extra care is high enough, the negligence standard will follow the
herd and evolve in a more demanding direction. Therefore, given
the sheer number of legal and extralegal reasons to overcomply
and the absence of countervailing cost constraints, feedback is ex-
tremely likely.
Moreover, the nature of the medical profession increases the
chance that a critical mass will follow from comparatively few in-
' Weiler et al., supra note 51, at 115, 126; O'Connell, supra note 40, at 126 n.4;
Quinn, supra note 57, at 470-71; see also Abraham & Weiler, supra note 85, at 408
("Indeed, were it not for such physician, as opposed to liability insurer, losses, it
would be difficult to explain the widespread incidence of defensive medicine.").
" Weiler et al., supra note 51, at 18; see also Localio et al., supra note 57, at 369-70
(finding no correlation between use of cesareans and claims paid and but lots of cor-
relation between use of cesareans and claims filed); Quinn, supra note 57, at 468
(modeling reputational effects "whether the claim is won or lost").
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stances of overcompliance. Physicians are very sensitive to peer re-
lations,' which makes them especially likely to respond to emerg-
ing trends in practice even if many of them have no reason to over-
comply on an individual basis. Even absent legal pressures,
medicine is subject to informational cascades: the more physicians
that adopt a new procedure, the greater the chance that other phy-
sicians will discount any individual misgivings and follow the herd."
(For example, if the most risk-averse practitioners adopt a new
technique, then their neighbors on the risk-aversion curve will
more readily follow, and then their neighbors, and so on.) Some
theorists have offered such cascades as the explanation for the high
incidence of useless procedures, such as tonsillectomies, and for
otherwise puzzling regional variations in practice.' And although
these cascades can easily take place without any court judgment
prompting or ratifying them, peer sensitivity also manifests in
strong physician reactions to the malpractice experiences of their
colleagues.91 A few salient claims experiences may therefore also
affect the way an entire specialty practices.
These informational cascades are even more likely when influen-
tial opinion leaders are among the overcompliant practice's early
"Peter A. Glassman et al., Physicians' Personal Malpractice Experiences Are Not
Related to Defensive Clinical Practices, 21 J. Health Pol. Pol'y & L. 219, 234 (1996);
Carol S. Weisman et al., Practice Changes in Response to the Malpractice Litigation
Climate: Results of a Maryland Physician Survey, 27 Med. Care 16, 22 (1989); see also
Weiler et al., supra note 51, at 128 (ranking peer relations high on list of factors influ-
encing physicians).8 9 Sushil Bikhchandani et al., Learning from the Behavior of Others: Conformity,
Fads, and Informational Cascades, 12 J. Econ. Persp. 151, 167 (1998).
'0 E.g., Sushil Bikhchandani et al., A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural
Change as Informational Cascades, 100 J. Pol. Econ. 992, 1011-12 (1992); see also
John F. Burnum, Medical Practice A la Mode, 317 New Eng. J. Med. 1220, 1222 (1987)
("[W]e physicians find ourselves, like lemmings, episodically and with a blind infec-
tious enthusiasm pushing certain diseases and treatments primarily because everyone
else is doing the same.").
" Indeed, personal experience with the malpractice system has little impact on phy-
sicians' conduct, Localio et al., supra note 57, at 370; Studdert et al., supra note 48, at
2615, but physicians are sensitive to the impact of malpractice on the larger profes-
sion, Glassman et al., supra note 88, at 234 (suggesting that "the signal to practice de-
fensively may have been broadcast so widely that individual experience is overshad-
owed by collective anxiety"); Weisman et al., supra note 88, at 22 (finding that
litigation experience of physician's specialty has more impact on propensity to prac-
tice defensive medicine than does litigation experience of physician himself or her-
self).
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adopters. For example, when it comes to use of a new technology,
physicians with prestigious educational pedigrees have been shown
to significantly influence their peers.' It should come as no sur-
prise, then, that when the providers of new medical treatments and
devices design their marketing efforts, they explicitly target such
opinion leaders 93-a strategy that has proved effective.94
All these characteristics of the health care industry make it easy
to aggregate the individual acts of overcompliance and turn them
into a feedback loop that alters the definition of reasonable care.95
And as the overcompliance works its way into professional prac-
tice, it loses its identity; a feedback effect of even moderate
strength will influence behavior in such a way that physicians
themselves will soon forget whether a particular practice originated
as defensive medicine, a response to marketing efforts, or a clinical
desideratum. 96 After all, the profession is accustomed to adopting
practices that have no scientific basis. 7 And that rare physician
who recognizes the waste inherent in a newly popular procedure
will be stuck on the horns of a dilemma; if she decides not to follow
the custom, a patient who later sues for malpractice will point to
this subconformity as proof of a lack of reasonable care."
In short, our hypothetical physician presented with a swollen
lymph node is not so hypothetical after all. Ordering an ultrasound
Mary A. Burke et al., The Diffusion of a Medical Innovation: Is Success in the
Stars?, 73 S. Econ. J. 588 (2007). There is a rich research literature on the importance
of opinion leaders in setting standards in medical care, but it tends to focus on effect-
ing positive change in practice. See G. Doumit et al., Local Opinion Leaders: Effects
on Professional Practice and Health Care Outcomes, Cochrane Database Systematic
Revs., Jan. 24, 2007 (reviewing studies).
3 Collier & Iheanacho, supra note 75, at 1408.
9 Burke et al., supra note 92, at 589.
9 Cf. Fisher & Welch, supra note 84, at 447 ("At both levels [individual and sys-
temic], ... the current cultural and legal environments exert tremendous pressure to
do more ... ").
Office of Technology Assessment, supra note 48, at 22.
9 See sources cited supra note 66.
' See Hall, supra note 46, at 119; Havighurst, supra note 41, at 159; Havighurst, su-
pra note 42, at 269. In game theory terms, any level of care would seem to provide a
Nash equilibrium, as long as it represents customary practice, but the superior effi-
ciency of mere compliance is quickly overwhelmed by the mismatch risk of increased
liability as one's peers migrate to a more demanding level of care. Cf. Paul G. Ma-
honey & Chris W. Sanchirico, Competing Norms and Social Evolution: Is the Fittest
Norm Efficient?, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2027, 2047 (2001) (discussing mismatch risk).
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will cost her nothing-in fact, it will likely increase her fee-and it
will distance her from negligence's gray area and thus reduce her
exposure to malpractice liability (an exposure that she probably
exaggerates). If her peers are ordering ultrasounds, or the ultra-
sound manufacturer has launched a marketing campaign, she will
be even more motivated to adopt the practice. In no event will she
await proof of the procedure's cost-effectiveness. Over time, a
critical mass is reached, and the new practice becomes customary,
feeding back into reasonable care doctrine and rendering compli-
ant that which was once overcompliant. And then, if another low-
cost, low-risk means of overcompliance is available (perhaps a bi-
opsy), the feedback cycle will begin once more.
E. Feedback in Action: Electronic Fetal Monitoring
If the foregoing explanation of doctrinal feedback in medical
malpractice law is correct, we might be able to identify particular
procedures that are the result of the feedback loop. There is cer-
tainly no shortage of candidates. Over the years, a depressingly
high number of common practices have turned out to be useless, or
at least vastly overused: hysterectomies, frontal lobotomies, radical
mastectomies, arthroscopic knee surgery, x-ray screening for lung
cancer, proton pump inhibitors, hormone replacement therapy,
high-dose chemotherapy for breast cancer, 9 use of lidocaine after
myocardial infarction,1" drug-coated cardiovascular stents,1 1 pre-
ventative angioplasty, bypass surgery,"° and various aggressive ap-
proaches to diabetes, heart attack, and varicose veins. 3
Many of these examples, however, involve practices that actually
did considerable harm to patients. One would therefore not expect
them to remain in common usage for long. Negligence law might
be slow to usher them out, given its deference to custom, but even
without an effective tort signal patients will not demand and physi-
cians will not administer treatments that are clearly harmful. In
9 Brownlee, supra note 66, at 27.
'® Leape et al., supra note 66, at 506.
101 Brownlee, supra note 66, at 172.
Id. at 101-05.
,0Robert H. Brook et al., The Relationship Between Medical Malpractice and
Quality of Care, 1975 Duke L.J. 1197, 1204; see also Robin, supra note 81, at 74-77
(listing twenty-four "iatroepidemics").
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contrast, doctrinal feedback involves practices that are merely
wasteful; as we have already seen, no physician is going to think
that performing a dangerous procedure will help avoid liability.
Here too there are many candidates, such as serologic testing for
Lyme disease, certain mammograms,"M tonsillectomies, screening
for coronary disease using radionuclide ventriculograms, some ar-
terial ligations, 1°5 use of perfusion lung scans to diagnose pulmo-
nary embolism,"° and prescription of antibiotics for colds, upper
respiratory tract infections, and bronchitis. 7 But if we hope to find
a tight feedback loop, where the legal standard not only incorpo-
rates but also creates departures from compliance, the most promis-
ing places to look are those areas where the specter of malpractice
liability looms large. And on that score, nothing beats obstetrics
and gynecology.
Obstetricians and gynecologists have historically been targets of
lawsuits more often than any other physicians°"-almost ninety
percent report having faced a lawsuit at some point in their ca-
reersl -and their payments to plaintiffs trend much higher than
the malpractice average."' It is not hard to imagine why; the ambi-
guity of the reasonable care standard gives a jury's emotional reac-
tions free rein, and nothing tugs at the heartstrings like an injury to
a newborn or impairment of a woman's ability to bear children."'
104 Richard E. Anderson, Billions for Defense, 159 Archives Internal Med. 2399,
2401 (1999).
1 Robin, supra note 81, at 74-75.
1 Id. at 69-73; Division of Lung Diseases, National Heart, Lung, and Blood Insti-
tute, Value of the Ventilation/Perfusion Scan in Acute Pulmonary Embolism, 263
JAMA 2753 (1990).
" Ralph Gonzales et al., Antibiotic Prescribing for Adults with Colds, Upper Res-
piratory Tract Infections, and Bronchitis by Ambulatory Care Physicians, 278 JAMA
901, 901 (1997).
"Nancy Ostergard, CRICO Obstetric and Gynecology Claims Review, 20 Forum
2, 2 (Risk Mgmt. Found. of the Harv. Med. Insts. 1999); David M. Studdert et al.,
Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 354
New Eng. J. Med. 2024, 2026 (2006).
0 Wilson & Strunk, supra note 52, at 3.
'0Ostergard, supra note 108, at 2.
Id. at 2; see also O'Connell, supra note 40, at 125 ("Because provider fault is fre-
quently difficult to measure... a lay jury is apt to be influenced more by its subjective
and emotional reaction to the injured patient's plight than by the appropriateness of
the defendant's conduct.").
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Obstetricians in particular face the most claims"2 and are more
likely than any other kind of physician to lose a malpractice
trial" 3-and they pay correspondingly high insurance premiums."'
It should come as no surprise that this legal exposure results in
defensive changes in obstetric practice. A substantial majority of
obstetricians report making such changes, most often by increasing
the number of cesarean deliveries they perform."5 And independ-
ent studies bolster this self-reporting: the incidence of cesarean de-
livery correlates positively with malpractice premiums, number of
claims per physician, number of patients discharged, and perceived
risk of suit.116
The increase in cesarean deliveries makes sense as a reaction to
tort's deterrent signal when one considers that of all obstetric and
gynecology cases, those involving labor and delivery produce the
most plaintiff verdicts"' and result in the highest jury awards in all
of medical malpractice (a median of $2.25 million)."8 These num-
bers are driven by the most common injury in obstetrics cases: neu-
rological damage to newborns, "9 which accounts for three-quarters
of all obstetric insurance losses2' and results in an average payment
12 Wilson & Strunk, supra note 52, at 15; see also Ostergard, supra note 108, at 2
(noting that obstetric claims account for almost three-quarters of ob/gyn insurance
losses).
"' Jury Verdict Research, Current Award Trends in Personal Injury 47 (6th ed.
2007).
14 Alastair MacLennan et al., Who Will Deliver Our Grandchildren?: Implications
of Cerebral Palsy Litigation, 294 JAMA 1688, 1688 (2005).
15 Wilson & Strunk, supra note 52, at 14.
,16 Localio et al., supra note 57; accord H. Shelton Brown III, Lawsuit Activity, De-
fensive Medicine, and Small Area Variation: The Case of Cesarean Sections Revis-
ited, 2 Health Econ. Pol'y & L. 285 (2007) (finding that increased lawsuits correlates
to increased use of cesarean sections even when controlling for small-area and hospi-
tal variation).
"' Stephen Daniels & Lori Andrews, The Shadow of the Law: Jury Decisions in Ob-
stetrics and Gynecology Cases, in 2 Institute of Medicine, Medical Professional Liabil-
ity and the Delivery of Obstetrical Care 161, 175 (1989).
'Jury Verdict Research, supra note 113, at 18.
"' Stephen B. Thacker, The Impact of Technology Assessment and Medical Mal-
practice on the Diffusion of Medical Technologies: The Case of Electronic Fetal
Monitoring, in 2 Institute of Medicine, supra note 117, at 9, 23; Wilson & Strunk, su-
pra note 52, at 15.
0 Ostergard, supra note 108, at 2.
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to plaintiff of more than $1.1 million. 2' In one recent study of all
malpractice claims, almost one in five plaintiffs was a newborn.'
Insofar as tort law is supposed to affect the behavior of those it
regulates, however, none of these various statistics proves that
anyone is overcomplying. Perhaps optimal obstetric care simply
requires more cesarean deliveries than obstetricians would usually
be inclined to perform, and the reasonable care standard is accord-
ingly sending the necessary deterrent signal. What we need, then, is
an ineffective test or procedure within obstetrics that we can exam-
ine for signs of doctrinal feedback.
As it happens, the most common obstetric procedure is an excel-
lent candidate: electronic fetal monitoring ("EFM").23 EFM is used
during labor and delivery to monitor a fetus's heart rate and vari-
ability for signs of distress. The idea is that abnormal heart rates
indicate oxygen deprivation, which can lead to brain damage.124
Failure to properly monitor the fetus is the basis for a significant
percentage of obstetrics suits, and the plaintiff success rate in such
cases tends to be quite high.25 Putting this all together, over half of
the insurance losses in this most high-risk category of clinical prac-
tice involve allegations that an obstetrician could have-but did
not-prevent a newborn's neurological impairment.26 And the
most common basis for these sorts of claims is delay in treatment
of fetal distress.1 27 And the most common obstetric procedure just
happens to be designed to monitor fetal distress: EFM. If doctrinal
feedback is to be found in medical malpractice, it should be found
here.
121 Wilson & Strunk, supra note 52, at 16. This figure is lower than the $2.25 million
cited above because the latter includes jury verdicts only, whereas the former also in-
cludes settlement payments.
,22 Studdert et al., supra note 108, at 2026.
123 American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Intrapartum Fetal Heart
Rate Monitoring (ACOG Practice Bulletin No. 70), 106 Obstetrics & Gynecology
1453, 1453 (2005) [hereinafter ACOG Bulletin No. 70].
24 Id. at 1453; Thacker, supra note 119, at 23.
125 Daniels & Andrews, supra note 117, at 183; Thacker, supra note 119, at 23; Wil-
son & Strunk, supra note 52, at 15.
126 Ostergard, supra note 108, at 2 (noting that obstetric claims account for almost
75% of total insurance losses and 75% of that 75% comes from cases involving neuro-
logical impairment).
127 Id. at 2.
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1. Efficacy of Fetal Monitoring
To evaluate EFM as an example of doctrinal feedback, we need
to understand its origins. Fetal monitoring via stethoscope-a
process known as auscultation-dates back to the early 1800s and
began as a method of ascertaining that the fetus was still viable. By
the end of the nineteenth century, however, some physicians had
begun using auscultation not only to discover whether a fetus was
alive, but also to predict risk of fetal death during labor. A heart-
beat that was too fast, too slow, or too irregular was an indication
of fetal distress, presumably due to lack of oxygen caused by con-
striction of the umbilical cord. The solution was to deliver the fetus
immediately, usually through a cesarean section or operative vagi-
nal delivery (e.g., use of forceps)."
The criteria for fetal distress that developed during this period
remained in use until the 1950s .1 9 At that point, advances in elec-
tronic monitoring of fetal heart rates began to overtake ausculta-
tion. Two EFM techniques in particular led the charge:
(1) attaching an ultrasound device to the mother's abdomen; and
(2) inserting an electrode through the cervix, where it would be af-
fixed to the fetal scalp. 3' The electronic signal would then be re-
corded as a series of waves, traced on graph paper.
It was not until the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, that
EFM entered clinical practice. One thousand EFM devices were in
use in the United States in 1972, and four years later 99% of teach-
ing hospitals had one."' By 1980, EFM had almost passed ausculta-
tion as the most popular method of monitoring,3 2 and by 1988 it
' Adrian Grant, Monitoring the Fetus During Labour, in 2 Effective Care in Preg-
nancy and Childbirth 846, 847 (lain Chalmers et al. eds., 1989).129 Id.
13 Id. at 848-49. External ultrasound monitoring is not as accurate as internal elec-
trode monitoring. Murray Enkin et al., A Guide to Effective Care in Pregnancy and
Childbirth 269 (2000); P.C.A.M. Bakker et al., The Quality of Intrapartum Fetal
Heart Rate Monitoring, 116 Eur. J. Obstetrics & Gynecology & Reprod. Biology 22,
22 (2004). For that reason, and because external monitoring restricts the mother's
ability to move, internal monitoring is often used in the later stages of labor-after
the membrane has ruptured. Enkin et al., supra, at 270.
,3, Grant, supra note 128, at 849.
Id. at 850 (noting that auscultation was used in 48% of births in 1980 versus 43%
for EFM).
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was far ahead, used in 62.2% of live births.33 In the early 1990s the
number increased to almost 75%, and in 2002 it hit 85%, making
EFM the most common obstetric procedure."'
Although the introduction of EFM into clinical practice and its
rapid adoption coincided with the malpractice explosions of the
1970s and 1980s, 36 the procedure had a plausible clinical basis. The
medical community had long thought that cerebral palsy and most
other forms of brain damage resulted from trauma to the infant
during labor. 37 Because EFM provided continuous and easily re-
cordable information about fetal intrapartum heart rate, it allowed
physicians to look for patterns and variations in a way that inter-
mittent auscultation could not.'38 As a result, the technique's pro-
ponents claimed that use of EFM could save the lives of thousands
of infants a year and could cut the rate of perinatal neurologic inju-
ries in half. 39
Physicians embraced EFM so wholeheartedly that several years
passed before anyone seriously considered rigorously testing the
new method to see if it delivered on its promise. Indeed, so con-
vinced was the medical community of EFM's benefits that ethical
concerns scuttled early plans for clinical testing, as it was thought
wrong to deny the technique's use to those patients who would
constitute the control group."' A similar irony underlay the first
randomized trial, which took place in 1976: the researcher con-
ducted the trial only out of a desire to generate some hard data
" Stephen B. Thacker et al., Efficacy and Safety of Intrapartum Electronic Fetal
Monitoring: An Update, 86 Obstetrics & Gynecology 613, 618 (1995).
134 Id.
135 ACOG Bulletin No. 70, supra note 123, at 1453. These figures may actually un-
der-report the method's popularity. See Bruce L. Flamm, Electronic Fetal Monitoring
in the United States, 21 Birth 105, 105 (1994).
' See infra text accompanying notes 169-74.
.. Ernest M. Graham et al., Intrapartum Electronic Fetal Heart Rate Monitoring
and the Prevention of Perinatal Brain Injury, 108 Obstetrics & Gynecology 656, 659-
60 (2006). The relation between brain damage and intrapartum trauma was first pro-
posed by a leading English physician in 1774. Peter W. Huber, Galileo's Revenge:
Junk Science in the Courtroom 75-76 (1991). Curiously, one of the dissenters from
this orthodoxy was Sigmund Freud; back when his interest was neurology, he opined
that fetal neuropathy was prenatal in origin, not perinatal. See id. at 82.
"See Margaret Lent, Note, The Medical and Legal Risks of the Electronic Fetal
Monitor, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 807, 810-11 (1999).
"' See Graham et al., supra note 137, at 658-59.
141 Id. at 659.
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that he could then use to convince recalcitrant mothers of the bene-
fits of EFM.' The results of the study-that EFM did not improve
patient outcomes-were thus a surprise even to him, let alone to
the rest of the obstetric community.
But this first trial was no fluke. A slew of subsequent studies be-
ginning in the 1970s and continuing through the present day con-
firms that EFM is no better than intermittent auscultation in pre-
venting death, injury, or impairment in newborns."2 Only two
studies-both led by the same researcher-have shown any bene-
fit. The first claimed that use of EFM decreased perinatal deaths
from hypoxia,' 3 but this result is inconsistent with every other
analysis of the same issue and the study has elicited much criticism
141 Id.
142 See, e.g., American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, ACOG Techni-
cal Bulletin No. 207 at 3 (1995) [hereinafter ACOG Bulletin No. 207] ("[A] substan-
tial body of evidence disproves the hypothesis that electronic fetal monitoring would
reduce long-term neurologic impairment and cerebral palsy in newborns so moni-
tored."); Enkin, supra note 130, at 271 ("There is no evidence that intensive fetal
heart-rate monitoring... reduces the risk of Apgar score less than 7, or the rates of
admission to special care nurseries."); Leah L. Albers, Clinical Issues in Electronic
Fetal Monitoring, 21 Birth 108, 108 (1994) ("Effective screening tools are valid and
reliable; this technology is neither."); Z. Alfirevic et al., Continuous Cardiotocogra-
phy (CTG) as a Form of Electronic Fetal Monitoring (EFM) for Fetal Assessment
During Labour, Cochrane D'base Systematic. Revs., Apr. 24, 2006, at 1 ("Continuous
cardiotocography during labour is associated with.., no significant differences in
cerebral palsy, infant mortality or other standard measures of neonatal well-being.");
ACOG Bulletin No. 70, supra note 123, at 1455-56 (noting that either method is fine
for low-risk patients and that there is no evidence either way for high-risk patients);
Grant, supra note 128, at 877-78 (recommending intermittent auscultation as "the
policy of choice in [the majority of] labours" and judging it as effective as EFM in
preventing intrapartum death); MacLennan et al., supra note 114, at 1688 ("EFM as
compared with monitoring by intermittent auscultation is associated with no decrease
in perinatal deaths, no fewer admissions to neonatal intensive care units, no fewer
Apgar scores below 7 or below 4, and no less incidence of [cerebral palsy]."); Karin B.
Nelson et al., Uncertain Value of Electronic Fetal Monitoring in Predicting Cerebral
Palsy, 334 New Eng. J. Med. 613, 617 (noting lack of cvidence that EFM helps reduce
cerebral palsy, low Apgar scores, acidosis, neonatal apnea, or the need for intuba-
tion); Nigel Paneth et al., Electronic Fetal Monitoring and Later Outcome, 16 Clinical
& Investigative Med. 159, 162 (1993) (noting no positive effect from use of EFM);
K.K. Shy et al., Evaluating a New Technology: The Effectiveness of Electronic Fetal
Heart Rate Monitoring, 8 Ann. Rev. Pub. Health 165, 187 (1987) (finding "increasing
evidence that EFM has little effect on perinatal outcomes"); Thacker et al., supra
note 133, at 618 (finding no decrease in morbidity or mortality).
"' See Anthony M. Vintzileous et al., A Randomized Trial of Intrapartum Elec-
tronic Fetal Heart Rate Monitoring Versus Intermittent Auscultation, 81 Obstetrics
& Gynecology 899 (1993).
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for its design and implementation. l" The second, a meta-analysis of
nine other studies, made the same claim,'45 but the American Col-
lege of Obstetricians and Gynecologists has called this finding "sta-
tistically unstable," as just one fewer death in the control group
would have changed the significance of the result.146 The only bene-
fit that randomized clinical trials have demonstrated with any con-
sistency is a reduction in the rate of neonatal seizures,"' and pre-
liminary follow-up studies suggest that such seizures-although
undoubtedly distressing when they occur-produce no lasting im-
pairment."'
It should come as no surprise, then, that the only medical out-
come that studies consistently associate with use of electronic
monitoring is an increase in cesareans and other operative deliver-
ies.149 Although auscultation works equally well, and although a va-
riety of less intrusive approaches to fetal distress are available (e.g.,
shifting the mother's position, giving her more oxygen, discontinu-
144 See, e.g., Marc J.N.C. Keirse, Electronic Monitoring: Who Needs a Trojan
Horse?, 21 Birth 111 (1994); James P. Neilson, Electronic Fetal Heart Rate Monitor-
ing During Labor: Information from Randomized Trials, 21 Birth 101, 104 (1994).I" See Anthony M. Vintzileous et al., Intrapartum Electronic Fetal Heart Rate
Monitoring Versus Intermittent Auscultation: A Meta-Analysis, 85 Obstetrics & Gy-
necology 149 (1995).
116 ACOG Bulletin No. 70, supra note 123, at 1455. Note also that one of the co-
authors of the second study was Barry Schifrin, an EFM pioneer who is one of the
procedure's few remaining defenders and who has built a lucrative consulting practice
called BPM (for "beats per minute") to assist plaintiffs in EFM-related litigation. See
Graham et al., note 137, at 662. In 2004, the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists famously and controversially censured Shifrin for his pro-plaintiff ex-
pert testimony in obstetric malpractice cases. Jessica M. Walker, Fighting a Muzzle,
Daily Bus. Rev., Aug. 8, 2005, at 1.147 Alfirevic et al., supra note 142, at 8; Graham et al., supra note 137, at 660-61;
Grant, supra note 128, at 872.
148 Graham et al., supra note 137, at 664; Grant, supra note 128, at 877; Thacker et
al., supra note 133, at 618.
149 ACOG Bulletin No. 70, supra note 123, at 1455; Grant, supra note 128, at 862;
Thacker et al., supra note 133, at 618; see also MacLennan, supra note 114, at 1688-89
("In 10 developed countries including the United States, despite a 5-fold increase in
cesarean deliveries over recent decades driven in part by the use of fetal monitoring,
the incidence of [cerebral palsy] has remained steady at about 1 in 500 births, cur-
rently around 9750 a year in the United States, with similar rates around the world.");
Graham et al., supra note 137, at 662 ("Although the cesarean delivery rate has in-
creased from 5% before the introduction of EFM to almost 25% today, the incidence
of cerebral palsy in term infants has remained unchanged at 1-2 in 1,000 births.").
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ing oxytocin'°), the medical community continues both to employ
EFM and-some twenty years after randomized trials proved it in-
efficacious'5'-to use it as a justification for operative delivery of
perfectly healthy infants.
2. Feedback and Fetal Monitoring
The evidence overwhelmingly shows that electronic monitoring
is wasteful at best and therapeutically useless at worst. Yet the
medical community continues to monitor fetuses electronically,
and continues to interpret the resulting tracings as warranting the
most radical form of intervention possible.
Why? Well, perhaps doctrinal feedback provides the answer. To
evaluate the role that feedback plays in the use of EFM, we must
answer two questions. First, does the technique represent over-
compliant behavior? Second, has that overcompliance become the
new legal norm by which clinicians are judged? If the answer to
both questions is yes, we can then also explore whether another it-
eration of overcompliance might arise: a new fetal monitoring pre-
caution representing the beginning of a new feedback cycle.
a. EFM and Overcompliance
EFM is certainly an example of overcompliant behavior. Its
benefits are evanescent: a small number of infants possibly saved
from neurological damage, and some reduction in neonatal sei-
zures that have not been shown to have any lasting effect. Its costs,
however, are significant. Most obvious is the expense of all those
unnecessary operative interventions, such as cesarean delivery. For
example, a thorough study of the use of EFM to prevent cerebral
palsy-one of the technique's main targets-estimated conserva-
tively that obstetricians would perform 2324 wasteful interventions
for every one that might help.'52 An estimate from the 1980s pegged
the annual cost of administering EFM and performing the extra ce-
1"0 Grant, supra note 128, at 854; accord ACOG Bulletin No. 207, supra note 142, at
5-6; Enkin, supra note 130, at 276.
' See Alfirevic et al., supra note 142 (summarizing extant research and reporting
continued association between cesarean sections and EFM).
1"2 Nelson et al., supra note 142, at 617.
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sareans at $750 million,153 a number that may be much higher now
that electronic monitoring has become universal. And this estimate
did not account for an equally important consequence of cesareans:
increased morbidity for the mother." Any invasive surgery carries
risks, and cesareans are no different. More than one in seven un-
scheduled cesarean operations results in complications15' and 4.1%
of complications are major (usually serious hemorrhaging) when
the cesarean is performed during labor, as would be the case for an
intervention prompted by intrapartum EFM readings. 56
A more subtle cost of electronic monitoring is the change it has
occasioned in the interaction between medical personnel and the
laboring mother. Auscultation requires one-on-one attention,
whereas EFM tracings can be monitored from afar. "7 The preva-
lence of electronic monitoring has therefore resulted in a more de-
personalized approach to obstetrics58 without any clear savings in
personnel or equipment costs."9 (This cost may seem extralegal in
nature, but as it happens one-on-one care and good doctor-patient
communication are factors that lead to better health outcomes and
fewer lawsuits.))
,. 1 Institute of Medicine, supra note 117, at 82.
' Enkin, supra note 130, at 259.
15Thomas Bergholt et al., Intraoperative Surgical Complication During Cesarean
Section: An Observational Study of the Incidence and Risk Factors, 82 Acta Obstetri-
cia et Gynecologica Scandinavica 251, 253 (2003).
16 Nelson, supra note 142, at 617. Because general anesthetics are often used in ce-
sareans, EFM also produces an increase in the use of such anesthesia, with all its at-
tendant risks. Grant, supra note 128, at 867.
' Enkin, supra note 130, at 190, 194; John A.D. Spencer, Electronic Fetal Monitor-
ing in the United Kingdom, 21 Birth 106, 107 (1994); see also Lent, supra note 138, at
819 ("Even when a clinician does enter the patient's room, the patient may still feel
neglected by the care provider, whose attention may be focused on the EFM monitor
tracings.").
158 Moreover, changes in staffing patterns may make this trend toward impersonal
care hard to reverse. See Albers, supra note 142, at 109-10; Ros Goddard, Electronic
Fetal Monitoring, 322 Brit. Med. J. 1436, 1437 (2001); Spencer, supra note 157, at 107
Indeed, EFM is so ubiquitous that the latest generation of obstetric caregivers is
probably not even trained in intermittent auscultation, so they could not use the more
personal approach even if they wanted to. Enkin, supra note 130, at 275; Shy et al.,
supra note 142, at 187.
,, Lent, supra note 138, at 821.
'60 See, e.g., Goddard, supra note 158, at 1437; Lent, supra note 138, at 820.
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Electronic monitoring's costs appear to outweigh its benefits. 6' It
therefore represents the kind of overcompliant behavior that we
would expect to arise under negligence law's vague reasonable care
standard-i.e., the sort of economically inefficient care that the
Calfee and Craswell model predicts. Before moving on to an analy-
sis of whether EFM has become part of the legal norm, however,
we should briefly examine the legal and extralegal reasons for the
persistence of such an apparently wasteful practice. Is there a tight
feedback loop, in which physicians' fear of liability is a prime
causal factor? Or are there significant extralegal motivations as
well? The answer will not affect whether we have feedback, but it
will tell us how much the legal system is to blame and inform the
solutions that might be used to solve the problem.
Extralegal considerations certainly provide some of the explana-
tion for electronic monitoring. We have already seen that when
EFM first emerged as a viable clinical practice, obstetricians gen-
erally believed that intrapartum trauma was at the root of many in-
fant deaths and disabilities, and that timely intervention might save
lives. Given this belief, the advantages of continuous electronic
tracings over intermittent auscultation seemed obvious; more in-
formation just had to be better than less. And EFM's development
was accompanied by marketing efforts6 2 and kudos in the popular
press, including a 1969 Life Magazine article with photos of a
healthy newborn resting safely in his mother's arms after an EFM-
assisted delivery delivered him from fetal distress. 63 How many pa-
'61 Indeed, even the two studies that claim some benefit from EFM recognize the
costs of the technique-and particularly the increase in operative deliveries-and al-
low for the possibility that such costs might outweigh the benefit. Vintzileos et al., In-
trapartum Electric Fetal Heart Rate Monitoring Versus Intermittent Auscultation: A
Meta-Analysis, supra note 145, at 154 ("[O]nce effectiveness is established, cost-
effectiveness should be investigated."); Vintzileos et al, A Randomized Trial, supra
note 143, at 903 (finding statistically significant increase in surgical intervention when
EFM used).
162 See Tamar Lewin, Despite Criticism, Fetal Monitors Are Likely to Remain in
Wide Use, N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1988, at 24 (crediting the "sales force marketing
[EFM] machines").
'63Watching the Unborn Inside the Womb: High-Risk Mothers and the Graph that
Raises Their Babies' Chances, Life Mag., July 25, 1969, at 64. To the attending physi-
cian's credit, his response to the baby's distress was simply to change the mother's po-
sition rather than perform a cesarean. Id. at 65.
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tients read that article and then demanded that their obstetrician
adopt the new technique?
Nevertheless, there are reasons to conclude that malpractice
concerns had something to do with the initial adoption of EFM and
almost certainly played a pivotal role in its spread and persistence.
First, fear of liability may subtly inform some of the seemingly ex-
tralegal explanations for EFM's rise to popularity, such as peer re-
lations, patient requests, and marketing. As discussed above, the
opinions and practices of peers exert a strong influence in medical
circles, which means that if some of EFM's early adopters were
motivated by malpractice pressures, those pressures may have indi-
rectly led to widespread overcompliance even among those physi-
cians who did not feel them firsthand. Fear of liability may simi-
larly suffuse obstetricians' responses to patient requests; in a
malpractice-sensitive environment, a patient whose demand for
EFM is refused is undoubtedly a patient more likely to sue if her
newborn has problems. " And the specter of malpractice explicitly
pervaded the promotional efforts on the part of EFM's pioneers as
well, even after doubts about the practice's efficacy began to
emerge.'65
Second, physicians may have originally thought that electronic
monitoring produced substantial benefits, but this is entirely con-
sistent with a feedback effect. Overcompliance is supposed to help
the patient; the idea is not that the extra care provides no benefit,
but simply that it costs more than it is worth. Of course, if physi-
cians believed not just that EFM provided benefits but also that
those benefits outweighed the costs, then their adoption of the
technique cannot properly be called defensive medicine because
the latter refers to the knowing provision of inefficient care. But as
we will soon see, the medical community continued to use EFM
even after its inefficiencies were revealed.
'
64 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
165 The best example of this is an article by EFM pioneer Barry Schifrin, whose con-
troversial confidence in the technique was discussed supra note 145. His article criti-
cized two prominent professional obstetric organizations, which had responded to the
increasingly compelling studies of EFM's inefficacy by approving the use of ausculta-
tion instead of EFM in low-risk births. Schifrin and his co-authors argued that the
threat of malpractice exposure warranted rejection of those recommendations and
continued use of EFM in all cases. Barry S. Schifrin et al., Electronic Fetal Monitoring
and Obstetrical Malpractice, 13 Law Med. Health Care 100, 101-02 (1985).
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, EFM began its journey
toward ubiquity in the early 1970s, just as the country was experi-
encing its first medical malpractice "crisis." Total malpractice pre-
miums increased from $60 million in 1960 to $1 billion in 1975. 66 In
the first half of the 1970s, one leading underwriter saw claims fre-
quency increase from one per twenty-three physicians to one per
eight-and these numbers understate the national average, as the
insurer did not provide coverage in such highly litigious states as
New York, California, and Florida.
16 7
Obstetrics was in the thick of this trend, as the plaintiff's bar
quickly learned to take advantage of the documentary evidence
that electronic monitoring generated." Record-setting and highly
salient jury awards followed. In a case seen as "the battleground
for the fetal heart monitor," an Oklahoma jury returned the largest
medical malpractice award in the state's history, punishing the de-
fendant for his failure to use EFM in the 1978 birth of a brain-
damaged infant. 69 And one of the four lawsuits highlighted in the
memoir of recent presidential candidate John Edwards was a
prominent 1979 trial in which the plaintiff claimed that incompe-
tent monitoring led to cerebral palsy and other ailments, a claim
that resulted in a $6.5 million verdict. In such an environment,
malpractice fears may have quietly informed obstetricians' unques-
tioning belief in the efficacy of an unproven technology. (By the
end of the decade, electronic monitoring had gone from an un-
known procedure to one used in forty-three percent of deliver-
ies.171)
'66 Brook et al., supra note 103, at 1197.
167 Danzon, supra note 79, at 60; see also Kenneth S. Abraham, Medical Malpractice
Reform: A Preliminary Analysis, 36 Md. L. Rev. 489, 490 n.3 (1977) (reporting that
same insurer saw claims frequency rise by 139% and claim severity by 117% between
1968 and 1974).
'6 Huber, supra note 137, at 78-82 (describing ways in which plaintiffs' attorneys
rapidly took advantage of EFM).
69 Paul Wenske, Doctor Told To Pay $2 Million, Daily Oklahoman, June 17, 1981,
at 1-2.
70 See John Edwards & John Auchard, Four Trials 49-113 (2004). To be fair to Ed-
wards, this trial took place when doubts as to EFM's efficacy had only just begun to
emerge and many obstetricians still believed that the practice could prevent neu-
rologic disorders. See Graham et al., supra note 137, at 659-60.
,7' Grant, supra note 128, at 850.
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Of course, correlation is not causation. But even if the rapid
adoption of EFM in the malpractice-sensitive environment of the
1970s represents mere coincidence, and extralegal factors were
truly responsible, liability concerns almost certainly informed elec-
tronic monitoring's continued growth in popularity even after its
inefficiencies came to light-and legal considerations likewise ex-
plain its persistence today. The evidence on this point, however,
converges with the evidence that EFM eventually became the legal
standard of care, so let us turn now to that issue.
b. EFM as Negligence Norm
Recall that the second condition for a complete feedback loop is
that the overcompliant behavior becomes so common that it forms
the new metric for reasonable care. There is little doubt that by the
late 1980s this was happening with EFM. In 1988 the technique was
used in six out of every ten births (a figure that may be conserva-
tive) . What's more, as studies conclusively showed that the prac-
tice cost more than it was worth, the obstetric community began to
acknowledge that malpractice fears rather than clinical considera-
tions were responsible for the growth and persistence of electronic
monitoring.'73
172 Flamm, supra note 135, at 105 (arguing that EFM use has been historically under-
reported); Thacker et al., supra note 133, at 618 (giving the 1988 figure).
"' "The electronic fetal monitor remains the norm, even in the face of clinical trials
showing no better results, both because we are beguiled by technology and because in
the current obstetrical climate, every patient is approached as a potential litigant."
Lewin, supra note 162, at 24 (quoting vice-chair of University of Washington's De-
partment of Family Medicine); accord Graham et al., supra note 137, at 660 (noting
relation between malpractice trials and "routine use of EFM"); Benjamin P. Sachs, Is
the Rising Rate of Cesarean Sections a Result of More Defensive Medicine?, in 2
Inst. of Med., supra note 117, at 27, 37-38 (finding "overwhelming evidence" that use
of EFM has to do with malpractice concerns); see also 1 Inst. of Med., supra note 117,
at 8 ("[A]fter reviewing the data indicating that electronic fetal monitoring has not
improved overall outcomes, the committee concluded that professional liability con-
cerns are at least partly responsible for the continued use of this technology.");
Thacker et al., supra note 133, at 619 (citing "unnecessary concerns regarding mal-
practice and litigation" as an unfortunate byproduct of EFM's rapid adoption);
Thacker, supra note 119, at 21 ("There is no doubt that many obstetricians have been
encouraged to use EFM because of a fear of liability for not using the 'customary pro-
cedure."'). Even one of the pioneers of the technique (one of its few remaining de-
fenders) admits that increased use of EFM had to do with the recognition that the fe-
tus was a patient to whom the physician owed a "duty" (a legal term), the public
1685
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It is easy to see why EFM use continued even after research be-
lied its initial promise. By the time the truth was known, a solid
majority of obstetricians was employing the technique, and we
have seen that for medical malpractice the pervasiveness of a prac-
tice matters more than its efficacy."' Thus, the conscientious clini-
cian confronted a prisoner's dilemma: follow the safe but ineffi-
cient custom of the herd, or become a maverick and risk exposure
to a negligence suit and the vagaries of the reasonable care stan-
dard.
The choice was clear. Indeed, even those physicians who paid at-
tention to the research and who vocally supported auscultation
admitted that they would continue to choose EFM in their own
practices.'75 As one researcher sagely observed, "It is one thing to
avoid introducing a new technique because trials show it to be inef-
fective. It is another to abandon a widely used method that is not
only perceived to be useful, but records of which are carefully scru-
tinized and sometimes pivotal in expensive legal actions.', 7 6 Defect-
ing from common practice only got harder as time went by and
more clinicians jumped on the bandwagon; in 1992 almost three in
four deliveries were electronically monitored, increasing to eighty-
five percent by 2002.'7
Small wonder, then, that electronic monitoring was being cited
as part of customary care as early as 1987178 and that a clear causal
connection between malpractice exposure and EFM's utilization
rate emerged.9 Commentators occasionally point out that choos-
expectation "that all pregnancy outcomes should be without flaw and perfect," and
"the litigious attitude of society." Richard H. Paul, Electronic Fetal Monitoring and
Later Outcome: A Thirty-Year Overview, 14 J. Perinatology 393,393 (1994).
174 See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
175 Lewin, supra note 162, at 24.
176 Neilson, supra note 144, at 103 (discussing EFM); accord Albers, supra note 142,
at 109 ("Once procedures are incorporated into practice, they are very hard to re-
move."); Goddard, supra note 158, at 1436 ("Unfortunately the dramatic increase in
litigation in obstetrics has tempered [a move back to auscultation], as the cardioto-
cograph has also become an important legal document.").
1 7 ACOG Bulletin No. 70, supra note 123, at 1453 (2002 figure); Thacker et al., su-
pra note 133, at 618 (1992 figure).
'8 Shy et al., supra note 142, at 187 ("EFM has become the generally accepted stan-
dard of care for the laboring mother in the U.S.").
179 A. Dale Tussing & Martha A. Wojtowycz, Malpractice, Defensive Medicine, and
Obstetric Behavior, 35 Med. Care 172, 186 (1997).
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ing auscultation over EFM is supported not only by clinical evi-
dence but also by plausible legal arguments (for example, the re-
spectable minority defense), but they also acknowledge that such
theories do not reflect the reality of living in the shadow of a vague
reasonable care standard, where risky lawsuits are-or are at least
perceived to be-commonplace.'" Nor are the costs of EFM likely
to impact any malpractice calculus; as one article put it, "obstetri-
cians are aware that parents whose babies are born with a serious
problem are apt to file malpractice suits while it is unlikely that
doctors will be sued for ordering unnecessary monitoring or ques-
tionable Caesareans.'
81
In short, a combination of malpractice concerns and extralegal
factors informed the initial adoption of electronic monitoring. And
once EFM became sufficiently popular, the reasonable care stan-
dard locked it in place, ensuring the persistence of the technique
even after its shortcomings became known. Doctrinal feedback has
therefore taken a wasteful practice that never should have devel-
oped in the first place and made it the standard by which physi-
cians are judged.
c. EFM and Feedback's Next Iteration
Because electronic monitoring has become the custom in obstet-
rics, doctrinal feedback has changed the technique's malpractice
significance. Its use can no longer be considered overcompliant be-
havior; it is instead merely compliant, such that its absence would
expose the practitioner to liability. A final issue to be considered,
therefore, is whether there are any signs of another iteration of
feedback. Are there new forms of overcompliance emerging in fe-
tal monitoring, so that the obstetrician who wants to steer clear of
,' E.g., Hall, supra note 46, at 128-29 (describing how expert testimony undermines
theoretical defenses); Thacker, supra note 119, at 21-23 (lamenting disconnect be-
tween reality, perception, and "how the law is intended to work"). Even the authors
of one of the most thorough debunkings of EFM's effectiveness equivocated when
challenged to urge abandonment of EFM, explaining that "medicolegal pressures can
influence physicians' decisions; it is not only obstetricians who will have to be edu-
cated in order to bring behavior more in line with medical evidence." Karin B. Nelson
et al., Letter to the Editor, Electronic Fetal Monitoring in Predicting Cerebral Palsy,
335 New Eng. J. Med. 287, 287-88 (1996).
8' Lewin, supra note 162, at 24.
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the reasonable care standard can do more than his or her peers-to
provide care that goes one step beyond the new EFM norm?
Whether a new feedback loop will form is a function of the same
cost-benefit calculus that caused EFM to become part of reason-
able care. The question, then, is whether there exists a low-cost,
low-risk measure that could help insulate obstetricians from liabil-
ity or that might gain popularity due to some extralegal factor. Al-
though there is no clear winner (yet), there are a host of contend-
ers for this next iteration of fetal monitoring, and every one of
them extends the inefficiencies of current practice.
For example, recall the two ways in which EFM can be achieved:
attaching an external ultrasound device to the mother's abdomen
or affixing an electrode to the fetus's scalp (which requires ruptur-
ing of the amniotic membrane-i.e., the mother's water must
break). One recent study shows that ultrasound produces more
signal loss than a scalp electrode; the researchers therefore make
the case for purposely rupturing the membrane early in labor so
that the more technically accurate method can be used.182 This
sounds relatively harmless-after all, the laboring mother's water
will break sooner or later-but there is no evidence that this extra
procedure would improve outcomes or provide any benefit for
mother or baby. Thus another round of feedback might proceed, in
incremental, inefficient steps toward an increasingly wasteful stan-
dard.183
To the medical community's credit, however, most of the search
for the next generation of fetal monitoring focuses on improving
the interpretation of EFM tracings. Electronic monitoring is actu-
ally better than auscultation at detecting fetal distress; the problem
is in determining which forms of distress indicate a need for inter-
vention."8 Indeed, the ambiguity in interpretation directly contrib-
utes to the malpractice pressures that obstetricians feel, as plain-
' Bakker et al., supra note 130, at 27.
183 Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 65, at 6 (noting that tort law's general defer-
ence to custom will encourage innovators to focus on "incremental improvements of
customary and conventional technologies").
',See ACOG Bulletin No. 70, supra note 123, at 1456-57; Grant, supra note 128, at
852-54.
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tiffs can easily find an expert to testify that their tracings warranted
immediate operative delivery."'
Efforts on this front began soon after EFM's inefficiencies came
to light. Almost twenty years ago, the American College of Obste-
tricians and Gynecologists propounded a set of interpretive guide-
lines for identifying those heart-rate patterns that indicated fetal
compromise.1" The criteria have continued to evolve since."' Nev-
ertheless, multiple studies soon showed a hopeless amount of in-
traobserver and interobserver variability in interpretation no mat-
ter what standards were used."
Attention has accordingly shifted to developing technologies
that could assist naked-eye interpretation of EFM tracings. 9 One
recent study tried to solve the variability problem by using a com-
puter to recognize ominous patterns, but the only finding was that
the computer analysis triggered "alerts" (i.e., identified a heart rate
as requiring attention) more often than its human counterparts 9 -
hardly a reassuring result for those hoping to reverse EFM's disap-
pointing cost-benefit tradeoff. Others developed a technique by
which an obstetrician takes a sample of the fetal scalp during labor
' Albers, supra note 142, at 109; Flamm, supra note 135, at 105; Graham et al., su-
pra note 137, at 664.
" Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Intrapartum Fetal Heart Rate
Monitoring (ACOG Technical Bulletin No. 132) 2-5 (1989).
'" See, e.g., ACOG Bulletin No. 207, supra note 142, at 68-69 (1995); Nat'l Inst. of
Child Health & Hum. Dev. Res. Plan. Workshop, Electronic Fetal Heart Rate Moni-
toring: Research Guidelines for Interpretation, 177 Am. J. Obstetrics & Gynecology
1385 (1997).
"8 See ACOG Bulletin No. 70, supra note 123, at 1456; Lawrence Devoe et al., A
Comparison of Visual Analyses of Intrapartum Fetal Heart Rate Tracings According
to the New National Institute of Child Health and Human Development Guidelines
with Computer Analyses by an Automated Fetal Heart Rate Monitoring System, 183
Am. J. Obstetrics & Gynecology 361, 365 (2000); Paneth et al., supra note 142, at 160-
61.
"'The cynic might view this search for a solution as representative of the profes-
sion's unproven assumption that more is better and its faith in the development of
new resources. As one researcher put it (apparently without any sense of irony),
"Clearly, additional technology is needed to help clinicians better manage this sub-
stantial group of patients [whose EFM tracings are ambiguous]." Frank H. Boehm,
Intrapartum Fetal Heart Rate Monitoring, 26 Obstetrics & Gynecology Clinics N.
Am. 623, 635 (1999).
"9 See Devoe et al., supra note 188, at 365; see also Graham et al., supra note 137, at
664 (concluding that, as of 2006, "computerized analysis of FHR tracings has failed to
gain clinical acceptance because of its inability to identify the hypoxic-ischemic fe-
tus").
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and assesses its pH level. Combining the resulting measurement
with EFM data reduces the number of cesareans, ' 9' but the odds of
a cesarean are still twice as high as with intermittent auscultation,
with no benefit other than seizure reduction." Scalp sampling is
also costly, invasive, and uncomfortable for the mother.93
The most recent wave of EFM "improvement" involves two ad-
vanced technologies: fetal electrocardiogram waveform analysis
and fetal pulse oximetry. Waveform analysis involves monitoring
certain electrical activity and patterns in the fetal heart through a
scalp electrode. 4 Pulse oximetry attempts to measure how much
oxygen the fetus is getting, using a sensor attached to the fetus's
cheek in utero. '95 Both methods are invasive, and neither reduces
overall cesarean rates," yet the latest research cites some potential
benefit to using them when conventional EFM tracings are not suf-
ficiently reassuring." As we have already seen, however, a high
percentage of EFM tracings can be viewed as non-reassuring, and
there is wide disagreement among those who interpret them-
including (and perhaps especially) among those obstetricians who
serve as plaintiff-side experts in malpractice trials.
Researchers can hardly be blamed for exploring ways to improve
on current EFM practice. Once we recognize that doctrinal feed-
back has locked the technique in place, it makes sense to write off
its current inefficiencies as a sunk cost and ask where we can go
from here. Moreover, it is unlikely that malpractice fears play
much of a role in such research, any more than they motivated
those who first developed EFM technology in the 1960s. This may
simply be how medicine sometimes evolves: a practice fails to de-
'9 See Enkin, supra note 130, at 279; Grant, supra note 128, at 853.
'9 Neilson, supra note 144, at 102.
,
93 Enkin, supra note 130, at 270; Boehm, supra note 189, at 630.
9 J.P. Neilson, Fetal Electrocardiogram (ECG) for Fetal Monitoring During La-
bour, Cochrane Database of Systematic Revs., Apr. 6, 2006, at 2.
'9 C.E. East et al., Fetal Pulse Oximetry for Fetal Assessment in Labour, Cochrane
Database of Systematic Revs., Jan. 17, 2007, at 3.
'" Id. at 2 (oximetry); Neilson, supra note 194, at 4 (waveform); see also Goddard,
supra note 158, at 1437 ("These newer tools [fetal pulse oximetry and fetal electro-
cardiography] may be useful as an adjunct to electronic monitoring, but they are no
more predictive of adverse outcomes.").
" East et al., supra note 195, at 8 (oximetry); Neilson, supra note 194, at 4-5 (wave-
form).
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liver on its initial promise, but the medical community keeps work-
ing on it until true benefits emerge.
For the purposes of doctrinal feedback, however, the issue is not
whether the development of new methods of medical care has legal
or extralegal causes. The issue is whether such motivations will
prompt wasteful adoption of those new methods among practitio-
ners. To the research community's credit, it has been cautious in
touting the benefits of the new techniques, and they have not yet
spread throughout clinical practice.198 Perhaps physicians are un-
characteristically reticent here, having learned a lesson from
EFM. 199
Yet EFM holds another lesson: well-meaning physicians can
adopt wasteful practices, using overly complicated and expensive
techniques where a simpler and cheaper approach would suffice.
Introduction of these new techniques may therefore produce an-
other ratcheting up of negligence's reasonable care standard. The
obstetrician who invests in electrocardiographic equipment for in-
trapartum waveform analysis may intend to use it only when con-
ventional EFM tracings exhibit "disquieting features," as the re-
search recommends.2' But it is notoriously hard to say which EFM
readings are "disquieting," and the machine is already there, so
why not use it for every birth? Surely it can do no harm, and the
added expense may bring peace of mind to everyone in the deliv-
ery room.
It can do harm, of course. The new methods produce no benefit
unless their use is confined to a small, indeterminate category of
cases. At the same time, they perpetuate use of the original, waste-
ful EFM technology while adding a new layer of costs and generat-
ing another set of ambiguous data for plaintiffs' experts to pore
over. And the more common the method, the more likely patients
198 See, e.g., East et al., supra note 195, at 8; Graham et al., supra note 137, at 664.
19See Jennifer Westgate et al., Plymouth Randomized Trial of Cardiotocogram
Only Versus ST Waveform Plus Cardiotocogram for Intrapartum Monitoring in 2400
Cases, 169 Am. J. Obstetrics & Gynecology 1151, 1158 (1993) ("We believe this is the
first time a new concept for fetal assessment that involves new technology has been
tested in a randomized trial before widespread introduction into obstetric practice.").200Neilson, supra note 194, at 5 (suggesting use of waveform analysis when EFM
shows "disquieting features").
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are to request it, and the more likely other obstetricians are to
adopt it.21 Before long, we have a new standard of care.
III. SOLUTIONS
Electronic fetal monitoring is just one illustration of doctrinal
feedback in medical malpractice law. A case can be made that the
phenomenon is to blame for many other apparently wasteful yet
common practices. Examples include the needless hospitalization
of patients with chest pain 21 the administration of prostate-specific
antigen tests to men who exhibit no symptoms of cancer, 3 the
overuse of imaging in emergency care,2 °4 and the wasteful ordering
of serologic tests and mammograms. 5
In our modern tort system, however, doctrinal feedback is only
one cloud in a storm of dysfunctionality. Therefore, if we focus too
intently on this one problem in isolation, we may cause more prob-
lems than we solve. As we examine possible solutions for the feed-
back phenomenon, then, we would do well to remember the cau-
tionary advice that Hippocrates gave to physicians: first, do no
harm. 6
With this in mind, the following discussion will begin by consid-
ering three relatively subtle adjustments that one could make in
20 A recent review of the research on fetal pulse oximetry concluded that "it may be
prudent when developing recommendations to encourage the individual woman and
her clinicians to make the decision to use or not use fetal pulse oximetry." East et al.,
supra note 195, at 8. Such communal decisionmaking is an invitation to inefficient
care.
202 See Katz et al., supra note 60, at 530; Pearson et al., supra note 59, at 563.
203 Brownlee, supra note 66, at 200-02; see also Sorum et al., supra note 52, at 307
(finding that malpractice worries, discomfort with uncertainty, and regret over not or-
dering test all correlate positively with use of PSA test despite research showing inef-
ficacy for asymptomatic patients).
204 See Brownlee, supra note 66, at 153-57; see also id. at 171 ("[S]tudies of the effec-
tiveness of imaging. .. have shown that the technology is improving care in only tiny
increments, even as utilization and costs are rising at meteoric rates."); Studdert et al.,
supra note 48, at 2612 (finding that 70% of emergency physicians admitted to "or-
der[ing] more diagnostic tests than were medically indicated"-a significantly higher
proportion than for other high-risk specialties).
25 Anderson, supra note 104, at 2401.
2 Although this saying is usually attributed to Hippocrates, its origin is actually un-
certain. The closest analog in the writings of Hippocrates is Book 1 of his Epidemics:
"As to diseases, make a habit of two things-to help, or at least to do no harm." 1
Hippocrates 165 (W.H.S. Jones trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1923).
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tort law's treatment of medical malpractice: reducing the ambiguity
of the governing legal norm, reducing physicians' legal exposure
(or, more accurately, their perception thereof), and reducing the
law's reliance on real-world practice. These approaches will not
only have few ripple effects within medical care, but they will also
be more generalizable to feedback scenarios in other fields of law.
Then we will address more sweeping changes, placing them in the
context of the longstanding tort reform and health care debates. As
we will see, each of these possible solutions shows some promise,
but none is a panacea.
A. Subtle Changes
The feedback loop in medical malpractice starts when physicians
provide more care than necessary. One reason they provide such
extra care is to steer clear of negligence law's murky reasonable
care standard. Finding ways to give physicians more guidance as to
what the law expects of them may therefore reduce defensive
medicine and stop doctrinal feedback, and particularly its "tight"
feedback loops, from happening. 7 Indeed, reducing ambiguity is
the sort of solution that should apply anywhere feedback rears its
ugly head.2"
One subtle adjustment in clinical practice might help make this
happen: the use of clinical guidelines . Suppose that experts in a
particular field could formally agree on specific criteria for when a
given test or procedure is medically advisable and when it is not.
For example, the obstetrics community might issue guidelines call-
ing for use of intermittent auscultation during labor instead of elec-
tronic monitoring, unless there are certain significant and specific
preexisting risk factors. The mere existence of such an agreed-upon
protocol might give sufficient comfort, even to the risk-averse, that
07 See Calfee & Craswell, supra note 19, at 1000-01 (discussing possible benefits of
reducing uncertainty).
2
" Note, however, that the degree of reduction in uncertainty is important, as under
Calfee and Craswell's model substantial uncertainty can sometimes generate more
efficient behavior than small uncertainty. See Craswell & Calfee, supra note 26, at
287.
2"Many commentators have suggested using guidelines to address defensive medi-
cine. E.g., Troyen A. Brennan, Practice Guidelines and Malpractice Litigation: Colli-
sion or Cohesion?, 16 J. Health Pol. Pol'y & L. 67, 67-68 (1991); Hall, supra note 46,
at 129-30; Localio et al., supra note 57, at 372; Studdert et al., supra note 48, at 2616.
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we would see a decline in defensive medicine. Thus the same factor
that causes inefficient informational cascades-i.e., the small, cohe-
sive nature of the community of physicians-might also help pro-
vide a solution.
Some attempts have been made along these lines, but reliance
on guidelines has been subject to myriad criticisms. Most problem-
atic is the frequent disagreement over what constitutes proper care,
given the absence of reliable scientific evidence for the vast major-
ity of procedures and treatments.21 This means that many guide-
lines will either be too vague to be of much use or will reflect the
victory of one particular constituency in a turf battle rather than a
true clinical consensus.11 Even when these obstacles are overcome,
guidelines become obsolete quickly," ' and practitioners rarely fol-
low them even when they view them positively."3
Despite these drawbacks, clinical guidelines have emerged for a
wide range of clinical situations. In fact, guidelines are so numer-
ous and varied that the notion of using them to establish a comfort
zone for physicians will clearly collapse under its own weight unless
the government gets involved."' As it happens, a few states have
20 Cf. Tancredi & Barondess, supra note 57, at 881 ("[O]ne cannot handle accu-
rately the issues involved in defensive medicine without having first established epi-
demiologically the soundness of medical procedures as they relate to specific out-
comes in patients.").
21 Hall, supra note 46, at 140-45; Bryan A. Liang, Error in Medicine: Legal Im-
pediments to U.S. Reform, 24 J. Health Pol. Pol'y & L. 27, 38 (1999); Bryan A. Liang
& David J. Cullen, The Legal System and Patient Safety: Charting a Divergent
Course, 91 Anesthesiology 609, 610 (1999); Mello, supra note 79, at 686-87.
212 Liang, supra note 211 at 38; Liang & Cullen, supra note 211, at 610.
213 Mello, supra note 79, at 683; Carter L. Williams, Note, Evidence-Based Medicine
in the Law Beyond Clinical Practice Guidelines: What Effect Will EBM Have on the
Standard of Care?, 61 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 479, 492-93 (2004); see also Albers, supra
note 142, at 109 (noting that clinicians continue to use EFM even though "[k]ey pro-
fessional organizations explicitly stated for over five years that electronic fetal moni-
toring is one of two options for assessing fetal response to labor in women of any risk
status"); David Siegel & Julio Lopez, Trends in Antihypertensive Drug Use in the
United States: Do the JNC V Recommendations Affect Prescribing?, 278 JAMA
1745, 1747 (1997) (showing that recommendation of prominent national panel of ex-
perts regarding hypertension medication had little effect on actual practice). One
happy exception is a set of guidelines for anesthesiologists that were developed for
Harvard's teaching hospitals in the 1980s and proved successful in reducing medical
error. See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 85, at 411-12.
2' One online clearinghouse for clinical guidelines had 2186 listed as of Septem-
ber 20, 2007, all of which were developed, reviewed, or revised within the previ-
ous five years. See Nat'l Guideline Clearinghouse, Guideline Index,
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flirted with the idea of formally incorporating guidelines into their
negligence standards. After all, the deference that courts pay to
customary practice means that the medical community already de-
termines its own liability metric, so why not allow it to do so more
deliberately?
The results of these experiments, however, are inconclusive at
best. The effort that advanced the farthest was Maine's, which in
the early 1990s launched a five-year pilot program under which the
legislature approved guidelines for certain clinical scenarios in an-
esthesiology, radiology, obstetrics, and emergency care.15 Physi-
cians who wanted to participate in the program could cite compli-
ance with the applicable guideline as an affirmative defense in any
ensuing malpractice case.216 Unfortunately, the program expired
without any claims being filed.217 Whether this demonstrates the
success of the measure is impossible to say, given the small number
of participating physicians (about four hundred) 218 and the applica-
tion of guidelines to such a limited set of clinical scenarios. Similar
experiments have taken place in Florida, Kentucky, Maryland,
Minnesota, and Vermont, but no useful data have yet emerged and
several of the projects have been abandoned.2 9
In the end, then, clinical guidelines have the potential to slow
down the feedback loop, but that potential will remain merely
theoretical at least until the bulk of clinical practices are scientifi-
cally supported (or debunked) or a consensus emerges about which
http://www.guideline.gov/browse/guideline-index.aspx (last visited Sept. 20, 2007); see
also Mello, supra note 79, at 653-54 (noting the "tremendous diversity" in guideline
design and content and observing that "[t]ort reformers who propose to use [guide-
lines] as the standard of care in medical malpractice cases therefore have many ques-
tions to answer regarding which guidelines will be applied in a particular case and
why").
215 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 24, §§ 2971-79 (1993) ("Medical Liability Demonstration
Project") (repealed 1999); see also Jennifer Begel, Maine Physician Practice Guide-
lines: Implications for Medical Malpractice Litigation, 47 Me. L. Rev. 69, 78-79 (1995)
(describing program).
216 Begel, supra note 215, at 81.
217 Mark Crane, Clinical Guidelines: A Malpractice Safety Net?, Med. Econ., Apr.
12, 1999, at 236, 243.218 Id.
219 See Office of Technology Assessment, supra note 48, at 145-46; Crane, supra
note 217, at 243; Williams, supra note 213, at 497; see also Mello, supra note 79, at
675-77 (questioning Maine model's efficacy).
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guidelines to apply and what legal protection they afford. Neither
contingency appears imminent.
The second relatively subtle adjustment one could make in the
interaction between tort law and the medical community is to re-
duce the latter's fear of liability. As discussed above, physicians
wildly overestimate their overall malpractice exposure, and they
mistakenly believe that errors in the legal system favor plaintiffs.
Therefore, if physicians were to be educated about their true risks,
perhaps they would cease practicing so defensively, which would
mean less feedback into the negligence standard.
For example, the vast majority of individuals injured by negli-
gent medical care never file a malpractice claim; studies peg the
number at no more than one in seven or eight, and the most exten-
sive data suggests that the figure is more like one in fifty.22 Merit-
less lawsuits are sometimes filed, of course, but three out of four
result in no payment to the plaintiff at all, and the payments in the
remainder are considerably lower than in meritorious cases.22 Even
in the high-stakes world of obstetrics and gynecology, money
changes hands in only one out of every three claims." Indeed,
studies consistently show not only that malpractice litigation
largely produces the correct result,"3 but also that the mistakes that
220 Danzon, supra note 79, at 24 (studying 1974 data for California hospitals and con-
cluding that "at most 1 in 10 negligent injuries resulted in a claim"); Weiler et al., su-
pra note 51, at 73 (finding "one in fifty" based on 1984 New York hospital data);
David M. Studdert et al., Negligent Care and Malpractice Claiming Behavior in Utah
and Colorado, 38 Med. Care 250, 254-55 (2000) (finding that "the probability of a
claim after a negligent adverse event is 2.5%"); see also Brennan, supra note 209, at
69 (summarizing studies); A. Russell Localio et al., Relation Between Malpractice
Claims and Adverse Events Due to Negligence: Results of the Harvard Medical Prac-
tice Study III, 325 New Eng. J. Med. 245, 245-46 (1991) (providing more data on
Weiler et al. study's 2% figure).
221 See Henry S. Farber & Michelle J. White, Medical Malpractice: An Empirical
Examination of the Litigation Process, 22 RAND J. Econ. 199, 205-07 (1991).
22 Wilson & Strunk, supra note 52, at 4.
223 See Farber & White, supra note 221, at 205-207; Mark I. Taragin et al. The Influ-
ence of Standard of Care and Severity of Injury on the Resolution of Medical Mal-
practice Claims, 117 Annals Internal Med. 780, 781 (1992). The methodology of these
studies is subject to some criticism, see Troyen A. Brennan et al., Relation Between
Negligent Adverse Events and the Outcomes Of Medical-Malpractice Litigation, 335
New Eng. J. Med. 1963, 1967 (1996), but similar results obtain under a different ap-
proach as well, see Studdert et al., supra note 108, at 2024.
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are made are more likely to favor the defendant than the plain-
tiff.2
24
So if physicians truly understood how much they exaggerate
their exposure, they would be less inclined to overcomply. In the-
ory this could eliminate defensive medicine altogether. 22 Alerting
the medical community to its own warped perceptions of the risks
and biases that await it in the courtroom could therefore go a long
way toward reducing the feedback problem in malpractice law,
even if risk aversion or extralegal influences perpetuated some
overcompliance.
Before we adopt this approach, however, we should recall Hip-
pocrates's warning and consider the other consequences of clearing
up physicians' misconceptions. Educating the medical community
about its true exposure might help return us to a world in which
unsullied clinical judgment prevails in practice and thus informs the
negligence standard. But there is reason to question whether that is
the world we want to live in. Consider again one of the statistics
cited in the previous paragraph: the vast majority of negligently in-
jured patients (ninety-eight percent, according to the most com-
prehensive study) never so much as file a claim, let alone recover
any payment. If medical malpractice is a litigation lottery, most of
its victims don't even buy tickets.
This has important implications for any attempt to fix doctrinal
feedback, or medical malpractice law in general, because it means
that the deterrent signal that emerges from actual instances of neg-
ligence is disproportionately weak. Here then we have an example
of the folly of focusing on only one aspect of the system: a preoc-
cupation with fixing the tort signal on the reception end may sim-
ply exacerbate an already serious problem on the transmission end.
Freeing physicians from their warped risk perceptions may allow
them to make clinical decisions based only (or mostly) on their
224 Studdert et al., Claims, supra note 108, at 2031; Michelle J. White, The Value of
Liability in Medical Malpractice, Health Aff., Fall 1994, at 75, 84. For a summary of
the research in this area, and a debunking of some earlier studies that suggested more
chaos in the system, see Tom Baker, Reconsidering the Harvard Medical Practice
Study Conclusions about the Validity of Medical Malpractice Claims, 33 J.L. Med. &
Ethics 501, 502 (2005).
m Indeed, a low probability of being sued might actually lead to systematic under-
compliance and a ratcheting down of the reasonable care standard. See supra note 20
and accompanying text.
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professional judgment, but in the vast majority of cases in which
that clinical judgment proves faulty, the tort system currently gives
them no incentive to improve.
One might wonder whether the deterrent signal from meritless
claims compensates for the diminished deterrent signal from the
many meritorious claims that go unfiled. The answer is no. Merit-
less cases clearly have some deterrent effect: roughly one in four
results in payment to the plaintiff (albeit a lower payment than
with a meritorious claim),226 and even the remainder impose costs
on the defendant."7 But the distortive signal generated by such
cases is not nearly strong enough to make up for the lack of any
signal from the unfiled meritorious claims.
Indeed, even within the small universe of filed cases, the signal
that is sent (but should not be) from meritless claims that neverthe-
less manage to extract payment is more than offset by the signal
that is not sent (but should be) from valid claims wrongly denied
compensation. 8 Add to that the lack of a signal from the many
meritorious claims that are never brought at all, and it is no sur-
prise that health care providers externalize the vast majority of the
costs of their own negligence. One study estimated the average so-
cietal loss for each iatrogenic negligent injury to be $157,000 (not
including legal expenses), with the tortfeasor spending only $4,800
per injury, even including the cost of defending both meritorious
and meritless cases.9 Another used more conservative assump-
tions yet still found that hospitals externalize seventy percent of
the cost of the negligent injuries they cause.'
226 Studdert et al., supra note 108, at 2029; see Farber & White, supra note 52, at
205-06.
227 See White, supra note 224, at 83 (calculating average legal cost of defending claim
to be approximately $16,000).2 See, e.g., id. at 83-84.
229 ld. at 82-84. I use White's $157,000 figure because it represents the true cost to
society of the injury; her other figure ($138,000) discounts for defendant-friendly legal
error. Likewise, 1 use her $4,800 figure rather than her $5,300 figure because the for-
mer represents the true cost to the tortfeasor under the present system, while the lat-
ter hypothesizes what that cost would be if error were eliminated. Id. at 84.
230 Michelle M. Mello et al., Who Pays for Medical Errors? An Analysis of Adverse
Event Costs, the Medical Liability System, and Incentives for Patient Safety Im-
provement, 4 J. Empirical Stud. 835, 847-50 (2007) (finding total societal cost per
iatrogenic negligent injury to be $113,280). One of the reasons this 70% figure is con-
servative is that it excludes injuries to newborns, id. at 845, who constitute one in
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In the end, then, there is static at both ends of the tort signal:
(1) too few meritorious cases are litigated, so on the transmission
end the signal is not as strong as it should be; but (2) physicians
vastly overestimate their legal exposure, so on the reception end
they act much more cautiously than the signal actually warrants. To
some extent these two deficiencies may cancel each other out: phy-
sicians' overcautious approach to providing care compensates for
the weakness in the deterrent signal. Doctrinal feedback may
therefore produce a level of care closer to tort's ideal than would
occur in its absence. If so, however, we should not spend time con-
gratulating ourselves on a well-oiled tort machine, because we
reach an acceptable result by pure happenstance. The designer of
such a system looks more like Rube Goldberg than Vilfredo
Pareto. And if more plaintiffs file cases or more physicians wise
up-both desirable goals-the entire contraption will come tum-
bling down.
Moreover, even this portrayal of a coincidentally competent tort
regime may be inaccurate, because it relies on an inherent assump-
tion about the proper measure of reasonable care. Consider the
studies that found that only a very small percentage of negligently
injured patients file a claim. Such studies make tort's deterrent sig-
nal appear too weak. But those studies used a definition of negli-
gence based on customary care-and it is the very formation of
that definition that doctrinal feedback calls into question. If cus-
tomary care is suboptimal or optimal, then those studies do indeed
suggest an overly weak tort signal. If, on the other hand, customary
care actually constitutes more care than an objective cost-benefit
analysis would warrant (a definite possibility, given the feedback
effect), then the studies' implications are more indeterminate. This
dilemma resists resolution. Even if custom is theoretically the cor-
rect legal standard for malpractice cases, it is probably impossible
in practice to decouple feedback-infected custom from custom
rooted in unsullied clinical judgment.
So neither reducing reasonable care's ambiguity nor reducing
the specter of malpractice liability seems to solve the feedback
problem. Might we instead reduce the law's eagerness to convert
every five malpractice plaintiffs and whose injuries generate some of the highest jury
awards in all cases. See supra notes 117-123 and accompanying text.
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real-world practice into legal norm? This brings us to the third and
last of the subtle adjustments we might make, and that is to bring
medical malpractice back into the negligence fold: stop relying on
custom, and instead treat physicians like all other tortfeasors. As
mentioned above, the deference to custom that physicians enjoy is
out of step with the rule in other tort cases. The explanations for
this special treatment have never been entirely convincing,23 and
they are considerably less so in light of the pernicious effect of doc-
trinal feedback.
We have already seen that the feedback model generally exposes
the recklessness of using custom as the preferred measure of legal
liability, as Richard Posner and Richard Epstein would have us
do.32 The medical malpractice example bears this out. Physician
and patient tend to interact with one another repeatedly and con-
sensually, with a natural emphasis on long-term cooperation and
common goals. Therefore, if Posner and Epstein are right, we
would expect medical care to develop welfare-enhancing customs
that warrant deference. Indeed, Posner has specifically argued that
the consensual nature of the physician-patient relationship is what
justifies the use of custom as the measure of negligence in medical
malpractice cases."'
Instead, malpractice's reasonable care standard allows wasteful
tests and procedures to become the norm. And they do so quickly,
precisely because of the close, echo chamber nature of the commu-
nity and the accompanying peer sensitivity and potential for infor-
mational cascades. Everyone sees what everyone else is doing and
so adjusts their behavior that much more rapidly. The repeat trans-
actions among cooperating parties make it easier for the taint of
overcompliance to spread. In contrast, custom that originates
among a more disparate collection of nonconsensual interactions,
such as slip-and-fall cases, is probably less susceptible to doctrinal
feedback.
Factfinders might accordingly be encouraged to reject the defer-
ential approach and accept Judge Hand's invitation. Juries would
231 See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 23, at 173-83 (critiquing deference to clinical cus-
tom).
232 See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
2
13 Posner, supra note 30, at 172; accord Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 65, at 22.
But see Danzon, supra note 79, at 141 (criticizing Posner and Epstein).
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then be free to make independent findings that a procedure or test,
although common, is unnecessary-i.e., that the fictional "reasona-
bly prudent doctor" would decline to administer it despite its popu-
larity among actual practitioners. Certainly the outlier who does
not engage in defensive medicine will make this very argument if
sued. If backed by evidence exogenous to custom, such as numer-
ous scientific studies showing the inefficacy of the practice, such an
argument should in all fairness win the day.
Nevertheless, even if deference to custom disappeared, a court
might have a hard time substituting its own judgment for that of
the majority of physicians when the defendant is arguing that the
reasonably prudent doctor-that "model of all proper quali-
ties "234 -would do less than what his or her peers actually do in the
real world. To a jury not familiar with the built-in inefficiencies of
health care, the mere fact that most physicians use a certain tech-
nique will strongly suggest that it is cost-effective and thus required
by tort law.235 Courts might hold that the negligence standard re-
quires physicians to do more than what common practice suggests
(as Judge Hand tells us, "a whole calling may have unduly
lagged" 236), but the opposite conclusion would be unlikely absent
compelling proof. For example, Helling v. Carey-the most fre-
quently cited example of a court's second-guessing clinical cus-
tom-involved the failure to administer a test for glaucoma.237 And
the court did not base its holding on the scientific literature; indeed
the prevailing custom was already overly conservative, and the rul-
ing simply made it more so.238
In any event, proof of a custom's inefficacy will often be unavail-
able. As already mentioned, most clinical practices derive from
longstanding tradition, without any origin in rigorous scientific
" Prosser and Keeton, supra note 3, § 32, at 174.
" See Clarence Morris, Custom and Negligence., 42 Colum. L. Rev. 1147, 1148
(1942) (discussing evidentiary role of custom). For a summary of the many other prac-
tical considerations and evidentiary rules that make custom influential even when in
theory courts refuse to defer to it, see Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 65, at 8-24.
236 The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932).
23'519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974) (holding ophthalmologist liable despite undisputed
evidence that test was not customary for patient's demographic).
2 Havighurst, supra note 41, at 159 n.45. Ironically, the promoters of electronic fe-
tal monitoring held up Helling as a reason to use the procedure even after studies be-
gan to reveal its shortcomings. See Schifrin et al., supra note 165, at 101.
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study. Even the field of fetal monitoring remains somewhat vague,
despite decades of research. We know that EFM is a procedure
whose costs exceed its benefits and that there is a superior alterna-
tive (intermittent auscultation). The reasonable care standard
should accordingly stop short of requiring the technique's use in
everyday obstetrics. Yet no one has ever studied whether any
monitoring is needed; the randomized trials have always compared
EFM to auscultation rather than comparing either method to no
monitoring at all.239 It may well be that neither form of fetal moni-
toring is cost-effective. Knowing that the reasonable care standard
should not include EFM thus tells little about what it should in-
clude.
In the end, then, if prevailing practice departs from the level of
optimal care, removing deference to custom may have little effect.
This is not to downplay the potential benefits of evidence-based
medicine, as the practice is known." The "almost compulsively in-
dividualistic" and idiosyncratic practice of medicine" and the occa-
sional disconnect between medical practitioners and medical re-
searchers... are real problems, which warrant attention regardless
of what we do about the overcompliance problem generally. But at
best this approach can do little more than chip away at the feed-
back problem.
B. Systemic Reforms
The foregoing discussion highlights the problems with tort law's
traditional approach to medical malpractice. The system is rife with
dysfunction even without doctrinal feedback pushing the reason-
able care standard into ever-more-conservative territory. This final
Section will therefore examine whether and how existing ap-
proaches to reforming health care's broader failings might also ad-
dress the feedback phenomenon.
For example, the traditional components of tort reform show
some promise when it comes to slowing down the feedback loop,
.. Roger K. Freeman, Problems with Intrapartum Fetal Heart Rate Monitoring In-
te retation and Management, 100 Obstetrics & Gynecology 813,813 (2002).
See generally Williams, supra note 213, at 492-93.
24 Sage, supra note 66, at 1774.
2 See Noah, supra note 67, at 383.
HeinOnline  -- 94 Va. L. Rev. 1702 2008
2008] Doctrinal Feedback and (Un)Reasonable Care
given their single-minded focus on reducing malpractice expo-
sure.243 Yet defensive medicine has continued throughout the tort
reform era, seemingly unabated.2 "4 And studies have shown that of
the many strands of tort reform, only damage caps and amendment
of the collateral source rule have had a consistent effect on mal-
practice costs."' Even those two measures are hard to square with
aims of the tort system. Damage caps restrict recovery for victims
who need compensation the most, namely those whose injuries are
the most costly. 26 Likewise, reducing the jury award by the amount
that the plaintiff has recovered from a collateral source (usually his
or her own health insurance) simply permits tortfeasors to bear
even less of the cost of their negligence than they already do, shift-
ing to the victim some of the loss from the tortfeasor's transgres-
sion-a questionable result from both a deterrence and a compen-
sation standpoint.
Another trend with potential implications for doctrinal feedback
is managed care, by which I mean the various cost-containment ini-
tiatives that both public and private entities have undertaken since
the 1980s. These include Medicare's payment of a fixed fee per
procedure, as well as HMOs, PPOs, the monitoring of utilization
rates, insurance policies that pay a capitated sum per patient, and
so forth."7 To the extent that these measures reduce the ability of
physicians and other health care providers to externalize costs,
they should help reduce the incidence of overcompliance and thus
retard the feedback effect.2 8 Again, however, there is no evidence
" For a summary of tort reform's usual suspects, see Office of Technology Assess-
ment, supra note 48, at 78-79. Note that reducing malpractice exposure will have no
effect on extralegal motivations to overcomply.
14 See supra notes 50-57.
" See Office of Technology Assessment, supra note 48, at 79 (summarizing studies).
246 One can, however, make a plausible case for limiting damages for pain and suf-
fering, given their "indeterminate and highly volatile" nature. See Jeffrey O'Connell,
Statutory Authorization of Nonpayment of Noneconomic Damages as Leverage for
Prompt Payment of Economic Damages in Personal Injury Cases, 71 Tenn. L. Rev.
191,195 (2003).1 For an excellent account of these trends, see Abraham & Weiler, supra note 85,
at 394-98.
" See Robinson, supra note 23, at 179. But see Sandeep Jauhar, Many Doctors,
Many Tests, No Rhyme or Reason, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 2008, at F5 (explaining that
latitude inherent in medical decision-making means that physicians respond to cost
controls by ordering more tests).
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that defensive medicine has slowed down since managed care ar-
rived on the scene. Perhaps the same problem that plagued clinical
guidelines and evidence-based medicine arises here: most devel-
opments in clinical practice occur without solid scientific basis,
such that even a tight-fisted insurer can only interfere so much with
the discretion a physician exercises. And as we have seen, once a
practice takes root, doctrinal feedback will ensure that it remains
part of customary care. 249
Indeed, all the possible solutions to the feedback problem that
we have considered seem to run up against the inherent ambiguity
of reasonable care. Under that standard, there is no escaping a cer-
tain latitude to overcomply, and recourse to physicians' real-world
practice seems equally inevitable given the absence of objective
evidence for most medical procedures. Doctrinal feedback accord-
ingly looms large under any of the foregoing approaches. There-
fore, the most promising way to address doctrinal feedback may be
to abandon reasonable care altogether. Two proposals for reform-
ing the medical malpractice system have taken this approach:
(1) using contract law to govern the doctor-patient relationship and
(2) establishing a no-fault regime for iatrogenic injury. Let us con-
sider each in turn.
The contract law approach begins with a simple question: why
does the law use a one-size-fits-all liability standard for medical
malpractice cases? After all, with the possible exception of emer-
gency care, transactions between patient and physician are consen-
sual. Why not allow the private market to apportion the risks of
medical care, in the same way that it sets the price and other terms
of the transaction? A number of scholars have asked and answered
that question over the years." Although patient choice may be too
restricted and health care too indispensable a commodity for indi-
249 For example, electronic fetal monitoring was not covered by insurance when it
was first developed, David Harrington & Mark Pilar, Fetal Monitors, 24x7, Feb. 2005,
http://www.24x7mag.com/issues/articles/2005-02j07.asp. Now, however, such monitors
"have become a part of standard care that is unlikely to vary based on insurance
type." Leo Turcotte et al., Medicaid Coverage and Medical Interventions During
Pregnancy, 5 Int'l J. Health Care Fin. & Econ. 255, 262 (2005).
"
0An excellent collection of articles on this issue can be found in Symposium,
Medical Malpractice: Can the Private Sector Find Relief?, 49 Law & Contemp. Probs.
Spring 1986; see also Danzon, supra note 79, at 141-42; Mello, supra note 79, at 668-
71.
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vidual contracting to produce a better system, this is not the place
to rehash the entire debate. Rather, the question here is how con-
tractual freedom to depart from a uniform negligence standard
would affect doctrinal feedback.
On that issue, several advantages present themselves. With room
to bargain, a patient might specifically request (or forbid) certain
treatments and procedures, depending on his or her risk tolerance,
and could make those preferences part of the contract. The physi-
cian would then have much more information about what conduct
would incur liability than the reasonable care standard provides,
leading to less overcompliance. Or the parties might agree to a less
demanding standard, such as gross negligence or recklessness,
which would diminish the specter of malpractice liability and thus
slow down the feedback effect.
Even if the law were to allow this kind of bargaining,251' however,
it is unclear whether private contract would fulfill its theoretical
promise. Most patients do not pay for their own health care, which
means they have little reason to take on more risk in exchange for
a better price.252 And even if they were to bargain, they would still
have to defer to some degree (perhaps to a great degree) to the su-
perior knowledge and training of the medical profession; indeed,
one of the traditional justifications for using a uniform negligence
standard is that patients lack the information and skills necessary
to assess the risks of medical care and to specify which treatments
and procedures are and are not in their interests. 23 Of course, this
does not mean that a tort regime is necessarily better,5 4 but it does
mean that much private risk allocation would by necessity incorpo-
rate the same vague, practice-dependent standards that cause the
feedback problem in the first place. The same would be true of a
contract that simply specified a less demanding standard of care: as
long as the standard were sufficiently ambiguous and referenced
25, It generally does not. See, e.g., Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441,
441-42 (Cal. 1963) (invalidating agreement releasing hospital from liability); Meiman
v. Rehab. Ctr., 444 S.W.2d 78, 80 (Ky. 1969) (same); Olson v. Molzen, 558 S.W.2d 429,
432 (Tenn. 1977) (same).
252I am indebted to Ken Abraham for pointing this out.
See Mello, supra note 79, at 6698-70; Morris, supra note 235, at 1163-64.
See Robinson, supra note 23, at 188-93 (critiquing the view that informational
asymmetry justifies the negligence regime).
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real-world practice, the physician would overcomply and doctrinal
feedback would creep back in."
Regardless of the extent of these drawbacks, however, a contrac-
tual approach to malpractice regulation has the advantage of giving
health care providers more of an incentive to manage medical risk.
If tracking errors and realistically assessing the likelihood of suit
were a higher priority, the static on both ends of the tort signal
would diminish, and feedback would as well.
56
For the individual physician, iatrogenic injury is probably too
rare for this kind of measurement to be meaningful, but entities
positioned to aggregate such data-such as hospitals, health plans,
and insurers-could take greater advantage. Hospitals in particular
are well placed for this purpose: they employ a sufficiently high
number of physicians to generate actuarially significant data about
negligent error,"' yet are close enough to the action to do some-
thing about such error when it occurs. Indeed, these benefits may
be so extensive that they justify removing all liability at the indi-
vidual level and placing it squarely on the larger organizations, an
approach known as enterprise liability."' Contracting our way into
a system under which hospitals bear the brunt of malpractice expo-
" For the same reason, we would not want to replace the current reasonable care
standard with a different top-down metric such as gross negligence. While Calfee and
Craswell endorse this solution, Craswell & Calfee, supra note 26, at 285, they fail to
recognize the danger of doctrinal feedback: any such standard would be sufficiently
ambiguous to prompt overcompliance, so it too could eventually become more de-
manding than intended. Moreover, given the static at both ends of the tort signal, we
cannot know whether the current standard is too demanding or not demanding
enough. See text following note 230, supra. A move to a less demanding standard
mVht therefore be a move in the wrong direction.
Indeed, error reporting and assessment are vital to any reform in this area. Liang,
supra note 211, at 28-30; Studdert et al., supra note 85, at 287.
See Brennan & Mello, supra note 85, at 271 (noting that "channeling programs"
in which one entity insures both hospital and staff can generate better actuarial data);
see also Studdert et al., supra note 85, at 283 (noting that hospitals are experience
rated).
' For a comprehensive review of these and other advantages of enterprise liability
in health care, see Abraham & Weiler, supra note 85, at 398-414. But see Michelle M.
Mello & David M. Studdert, Deconstructing Negligence: The Role of Individual and
System Factors in Causing Medical Injuries, 96 Geo. L.J. 599 (2008) (arguing that re-
sults of empirical study support joint individual and enterprise liability).
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sure could therefore have a real effect on the incidence of defen-
sive medicine and the feedback it fuels. 9
Contract law is thus most likely to help address doctrinal feed-
back by tailoring the distribution of risk among the institutional
providers of medical care, rather than at the doctor-patient level.
Indeed, the inevitable refusal of some patients to agree to forgo
physician liability in favor of hospital-only liability would make it
impossible to implement a formal enterprise liability regime
through contract alone, although we might reach the same result
more informally if hospitals agreed to indemnify their physicians.2
As Ken Abraham and Paul Weiler have proposed, the more feasi-
ble course would be to use legislation to shift liability away from
the individual-placing it in the first instance on hospitals but al-
lowing them to contract with the other interested enterprises
(namely those who finance health care) to share or shift the risk.6
Such an arrangement would presumably reduce overcompliance,
and feedback with it, both because it would produce more in-
formed risk management and because no physician would ever be
formally named as the party responsible for having caused injury to
a patient.
As long as we are considering changes to first principles of tort
law, however, we must address one last systemic reform and its ef-
fect on doctrinal feedback: no-fault liability." A no-fault regime
would abandon the reasonable care standard completely, requiring
compensation regardless of fault. In its most radical form it would
cover all iatrogenic harm, although the years have seen various
proposals and programs of more limited scope. 63
" See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 85, at 417-18 (discussing effect of enterprise
liability on defensive medicine).
260See id. at 429.
261 Id. at 419-20.
262 See generally Jeffrey O'Connell, An Alternative to Abandoning Tort Liability:
Elective No-Fault Insurance for Many Kinds of Injuries, 60 Minn. L. Rev. 501 (1976).
263 E.g., National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, tit. III,
100 Stat. 3743, 3755 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to -34) (creating federal
no-fault scheme for compensating children who experience adverse side effect from
vaccine); Laurence R. Tancredi & Randall R. Bovbjerg, Rethinking Responsibility
for Patient Injury: Accelerated-Compensation Events, A Malpractice and Quality Re-
form Ripe for a Test, 54 Law & Contemp. Probs., Spring 1991, at 147 (proposing no-
fault for certain easily identifiable injuries).
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First-party no-fault, in which the victim bears the full loss, should
be entirely immune to doctrinal feedback. It makes no judgment as
to fault at all (let alone a judgment based on any particular real-
world practice) and imposes no cost on the physician. And al-
though this regime sounds radical, it reflects the current reality for
most victims of iatrogenic injury. Obviously those victims whose in-
juries are not the result of negligence receive no compensation un-
der present law, except for those very few who manage to recover
on a meritless malpractice claim. But even those injured by negli-
gence end up bearing their own loss in roughly ninety-eight of
every one hundred cases, because they rarely sue, and they don't
always succeed when they do.2"
Yet we have seen that overcompliance is pervasive even under
this "default no-fault" arrangement. It might therefore take a for-
mal, full-scale move to a first-party regime to convince physicians
not to overreact to the specter of liability and thus solve the doc-
trinal feedback problem. A case can be made that such a move
would produce a better system than that which we currently have.265
But political realities make that an impossibility, except perhaps as
part of a government-backed universal health care system, and
doctrinal feedback will hardly be driving that train.
The alternative is a third-party no-fault regime, under which the
health care provider is strictly liable for all iatrogenic injury it
causes. Moving to such a regime is hardly easy to do as a political
matter, but at least the obligation to pay remains with the provider,
which should make it more palatable. Moreover, various limited
forms of strict liability are already in place. For example, Virginia
has a no-fault regime for birth-related neurological injuries, funded
by a tax on physicians.2"
264 See sources cited supra note 220 (summarizing studies on percentage of victims of
medical negligence who file suit); Studdert et al., supra note 108, at 2028 (finding that
only 73% of meritorious medical malpractice claims result in compensation).
265 O'Connell, supra note 262, at 517-19.
2Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act, 1987 Va. Acts 830
(codified as amended at Va. Code Ann. § 38.2-5000 to -5021). The Virginia legislation
is, however, hardly a shining example of how to design a strict liability system. See
Richard A. Epstein, Market and Regulatory Approaches to Medical Malpractice: The
Virginia Obstetrical No-Fault Statute, in 2 Institute of Medicine, supra note 117, at
115, 124-32 (criticizing Virginia program); James A. Henderson, The Virginia Birth-
Related Injury Compensation Act: Limited No-Fault Statutes as Solutions to the
"Medical Malpractice Crisis," in 2 Institute of Medicine, supra note 117, at 194, 208-
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How would strict liability impact doctrinal feedback? The an-
swer lies in the difference between first-party no-fault and third-
party strict liability. The latter is preferable to the former only if
shifting the loss from the patient to the provider produces more
benefit than cost. And the main cost is the administrative effort re-
quired to show causation: people who go to the doctor are usually
sick to begin with, so proving that medical care made them sicker is
a challenging task.267 The benefit is increased deterrence: we pre-
sume that physicians can more easily take measures to avoid iatro-
genic injury in the first place, and so we place the duty to compen-
sate on them."
This cheapest cost avoider argument is, of course, the justifica-
tion for tort law's current apportionment of liability in medical
malpractice. The difference is that current tort law requires proof
of negligence and causation, whereas strict liability looks at causa-
tion alone. At first blush, this difference might appear to make lit-
tle difference for doctrinal feedback, particularly when the feed-
back loop is "tight." Recall that the overcompliance behind tight
feedback loops comes from the uninsured costs of liability, which
weigh heavily on the mind of the average physician-the reputa-
tional effects, the emotional distress, and so on. Certainly those
costs would be lower if liability did not carry with it the stigma of
having provided substandard care, but they would not be zero. In
other words, the purported benefit of strict liability over first-party
no-fault is the very thing that causes overcompliance: legal respon-
sibility for iatrogenic injury.
09 (same). In fact, it suffers from some of the same misunderstandings about birth-
related injury that led to the adoption of electronic monitoring: a lack of EFM trac-
ings creates a "rebuttable presumption of fetal distress" in cases governed by the Act!
Va. Code Ann. § 38.2-5008(A)(1)(b).
267 Weiler et al., supra note 51, at 82; O'Connell, supra note 262, at 521. The cost
would probably fall somewhere between the cost of proving both causation and negli-
gence, which the current system requires and which takes approximately fifty-five
cents of every malpractice dollar, and the administrative cost of the no-fault workers'
compensation system, which deals with less thorny causation problems and usually
spends about twenty cents of each dollar on administration. See Thomas A. Eaton &
Susette M. Talarico, A Profile of Tort Litigation in Georgia and Reflections on Tort
Reform, 30 Ga. L. Rev. 627, 673 (1996) (citing overhead figure of 55% in medical
malpractice compared to 20% in worker's compensation).
26 See Robinson, supra note 23, at 181 (discussing intuitive assumption that physi-
cians' superior training and knowledge makes them cheapest cost avoiders).
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Nevertheless, even if overcompliance continued, a strict liability
regime would not produce full-fledged feedback. The reason is
simple: with reasonable care out of the picture, the law would no
longer incorporate medical custom into the liability determination.
Moreover, strict liability could even reduce the inefficiencies of de-
fensive care, as the sheer number of newly compensable parties
would generate a host of data about medical error, and the absence
of the negligence stigma would make physicians less reluctant to
report such error than they are under current law.69 This suggests
that the best approach would include both strict liability and enter-
prise liability-the former to rid the system of the many failings of
negligence law, and the latter to take fullest advantage of the re-
sulting increase in data on how medicine causes injuries.270
In any event, when one considers the high incidence of over-
compliance, the feedback it produces, the inability of the insurance
market to pass along tort's deterrence signal, physicians' wildly in-
accurate impressions of their malpractice exposure, and the failure
of the current fault-based regime to provide compensation in the
vast majority of deserving cases, a move away from the current
negligence standard seems advisable. Indeed, sticking with reason-
able care and its feedback-fueling, ever-diminishing significance is
perhaps the most radical option.
IV. BEYOND MALPRACTICE
In a sense, doctrinal feedback in medical malpractice is the low-
hanging fruit. The specter of liability looms large, the environment
is cost-insensitive, and a rich empirical literature details practitio-
ner practices and motivations. In such circumstances, we should
269 Under the current system,
45% of [physicians] with direct personal knowledge of a physician in their hos-
pital group or practice who was impaired or incompetent did not always report
that physician. Of those with direct personal knowledge of a serious medical er-
ror, 46% did not report that error to authorities on at least 1 occasion.
Campbell et al., supra note 71, at 799. This despite the fact that more than nine out of
ten physicians admit that they should report impaired or incompetent colleagues and
significant medical errors. Id. at 797.
70 David M. Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, The Patient Safety Case for No-Fault
Compensation, 23 Forum 7 (Risk Mgmt. Found. of the Harv. Med. Insts. 2003); see
also Abraham & Weiler, supra note 86, at 432-36 (pointing out many advantages of
combining enterprise liability and no-fault).
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not be surprised to find evidence of the feedback phenomenon at
work. Doctrinal feedback in other areas of tort law may be harder
to see, but inconspicuous does not mean immaterial; custom and
convention can be influential in practice even where the law does
not defer to them in theory.271' For instance, feedback may be re-
sponsible for the increasingly fatuous warning labels on consumer
goods, as manufacturers avoid jury judgments on products liability
by staying one step more conservative than the norm.
("CAUTION! Do NOT swallow nails! May cause irritation!" reads
the label on a box of-you guessed it-nails.272)
The many other fields of law that use reasonableness as a touch-
stone could suffer a similar fate. Perhaps "reasonable accommoda-
tions" for disabled employees become progressively more accom-
modating, as risk-averse employers give federal disability law a
wide berth.273 Or consider "reasonable expectations of privacy," the
touchstone for determining whether a search violates the Fourth
Amendment.274 Police operating in the shadow of this vague stan-
dard may consistently undercomply-i.e., conduct illegal
searches-knowing that the upside is great (the discovery of in-
criminatory evidence) and the downside unlikely (the exclusion of
that evidence). If so, then we might eventually grow accustomed to
such intrusions, which means that our reasonable expectations
would diminish and our constitutional rights would dutifully follow.
Law enforcement would then have even more license to intrude on
our privacy, and the cycle would begin anew. 75
Moreover, reasonableness standards represent only one oppor-
tunity for real-world practice to inadvertently lead the law astray.
As I have discussed elsewhere, doctrinal feedback infects intellec-
271 See Morris, supra note 235, at 1148 (explaining evidentiary significance of cus-
tom); Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 66, at 8-24 (summarizing practical consid-
erations and evidentiary rules that promote informal deference to custom).
272 Jane Easter Bahls, Better Safe .... Entrepreneur, July 2003, at 76.
173 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (imposing liability for "not making reasonable ac-
commodations" to disabled employees).
274 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
275 On the other hand, rights-enhancing feedback could theoretically occur when
Congress forces law enforcement to operate under more severe restrictions on sur-
veillance than the Constitution requires, as it has done with regard to the protection
of telephone records. Cf. Laurence H. Tribe, Bush Stomps on Fourth Amendment,
Boston Globe, May 16, 2006, at A15. (I am indebted to my wife for, among many
other things, pointing this article out.)
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tual property law, yet we find no reasonableness standard there."6
What we do find, however, is a reference to real-world practice in
the form of deference to existing licensing markets. We can ac-
cordingly look for the feedback phenomenon whenever the law re-
fers to the conventions of those it governs-e.g., when ambiguous
contract terms find meaning in custom and usage of trade.7 8
I do not mean to imply that doctrinal feedback plays a pivotal
role in all these disparate fields. Brevity requires these examples to
be simplistic. (The Fourth Amendment analysis, for instance, as-
sumes that courts determine reasonable expectations by examining
actual public attitudes toward privacy, when in fact the inquiry is
often more abstract.7 9) Rather, my point is to suggest that doctrinal
feedback is a largely unexplored phenomenon, and that further re-
search into its influence on both doctrine and real-world practice
might bear fruit in a variety of otherwise dissimilar contexts.
Nor do I mean to imply that reference to custom and shared ex-
perience is inherently illegitimate, or that we could escape their in-
fluence even if it were. Indeed, faith in real-world practice unites
otherwise heterogeneous legal thinkers. Its importance is acknowl-
edged not only by those who would devise policy from convention
and tradition (e.g., Burke, von Savigny, and Hume), but also by
those who generally favor a more top-down style of governance
276See Gibson, supra note 6.
277 Id. at 895-98.
27812 Williston & Lord, supra note 7, § 34:5, at 29.
279 For example, in deciding whether use of a surveillance method (e.g., airplanes,
helicopters, thermal imaging) is constitutional, the case law consistently examines
how familiar the particular technology is. E.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34-
35 (2001) (ruling unconstitutional the use of a thermal imaging device to peer through
the walls of a house because inter alia the technology "is not in general public use").
Yet even here we may see a feedback loop of sorts: if privacy-eroding technologies
proliferate more quickly than privacy-preserving technologies, our expectations will
inexorably diminish-or at least doctrine will interpret them as having diminished,
and our constitutional rights along with them-making it easier for the next, more in-
trusive technology to gain a toehold in the realm of reasonableness. See California v.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (finding that defendant's Stone Age technology, a
ten-foot wall, was insufficient to create reasonable expectation of privacy vis-A-vis
airplane overflight "[i]n an age where private and commercial flight in the public air-
ways is routine"); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450-51 (1989) (citing Ciraolo for
proposition that surveillance into interior of building via low-flying helicopter is con-
stitutional).
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(e.g., Bentham and Hegel).' In American jurisprudence we hear
paeans to practice from foundational legal realists like Karl Lle-
wellyn and from libertarian scholars like Richard Epstein." My
aim here is not to contradict the entire canon, but to suggest that
we must proceed carefully when we employ, as we so often do, a
standard that both derives from and informs custom.
CONCLUSION
Many legal norms draw their definition from real-world practice.
This approach to policymaking has intuitive appeal, as such norms
anchor the law in communal consensus and give courts the flexibil-
ity to reach just results. But reference to real-world practice also
has a dark side: a feedback effect that can rob legal norms of their
efficiency and legitimacy and change behavior in unexpected, un-
helpful, and unrecognized ways.
Tort's familiar reasonable care standard showcases this perni-
cious phenomenon-particularly in medical malpractice, where the
law has produced and perpetuated wasteful practices and served as
more of a hindrance than a help in regulating physicians' conduct.
Given the frequency with which legal norms refer to custom and
convention, however, doctrinal feedback undoubtedly occurs else-
where as well; the malpractice example only scratches the surface.
' See 2 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, in Select Works
1, 102 (E.J. Payne ed., Legal Classics Library 1990) (1790) ("We are afraid to put men
to live and trade each of his own private stock of reason; because we suspect that this
stock in each man is small, and that the individuals would do better to avail them-
selves of the general bank and capital of nations and of ages."); G.W.F. Hegel, Phi-
losophy of Right 269, at 205 (S.W. Dyde trans., Batoche Books 2001) (1820) ("We
cannot by means of predicates, propositions, etc., reach any right, estimate of the
state, which should be apprehended as an organism."); David Hume, A Treatise of
Human Nature 351 (Dover Publ'ns 2003) (1739) (observing that "justice takes its rise
from human conventions"); Frederick Carl von Savigny, Of the Vocation of Our Age
for Legislation and Jurisprudence 30 (Abraham Hayward trans., Legal Classics Li-
brary 1986) (2d ed. 1831) (defending law formed "by internal silently-operating pow-
ers, not by the arbitrary will of a law-giver"); 1 Jeremy Bentham, Essay on the Influ-
ence of Time and Place in Matters of Legislation, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham
169, 180 (Russell & Russell 1962) (John Bowring ed., 1843) (noting that "prejudice
and the blindest custom must be humored").
"' See Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition 122 (1960) (discussing the
"immanent law" that "is indwelling in the very circumstances of life"); Epstein, supra
note 30, at 4 ("[W]here consistent custom emerges, regardless of its origins, it should
be followed.").
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In the end, reference to real-world practice may seem both sen-
sible and defensible-indeed, it accords with neoclassical economic
theory-but the real world is never as simple as theory would lead
us to believe. We must recognize instead that the very doctrines
that derive from practice can also distort it.
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